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Article 4

DOCTRINE FORMULATION AND DISTRUST
Toby J Heytens*
Legal scholars exhaustively debate the substantive wisdom of Supreme
Court decisions and the appropriatemethods for interpreting legal texts but
rarely consider the more pragmatic need to craft rules that will be faithfully
implemented by the lower court judges who have the last word in the overwhelming majority of cases. Political scientists, in contrast, invest tremendous effort seeking to determine whether lower courts "comply" with Supreme
Court directives, but find themselves unable to explain why their own studies
generally find high levels of compliance. This Article argues that part of the
answer lies in the Court's ability to craft legal doctrines that both shape a
trial court's initial decision and increase the efficacy of appellatemonitoring.
After identifying numerous strategiesfor increasinglower court control, this
Article argues that appreciating the links between them helps illuminate
recent developments in three areas of public law: the constitutional law of
punitive damages; the rules governing "officer suits" brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; and the concept of "reasonable"searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars exhaustively debate the substantive wisdom of
Supreme Court decisions and appropriate methods for interpreting
legal texts. Yet even scholars who emphasize the need to consider the
more pragmatic process of translating first-order legal meaning into
second-order legal doctrine' have tended to neglect one critically
important consideration: the need to craft rules that can and will be
faithfully implemented by the lower court judges who have the last
word in the overwhelming majority of litigated cases. "fJ] udicial poli2
cies," we lawyers too often forget, "do not implement themselves."
In contrast, political scientists have invested great effort in determining whether lower courts have "complied" with Supreme Court
directives, both during the Warren era and more recently. 3 But com1 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001);
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-61 (2004);
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-30
(1975); Kermit Roosevelt III, ConstitutionalCalcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1658-86 (2005); Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-20
(1978).
2 BRADLEY C. CANNON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES I (2d ed. 1999).
Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983), is a notable exception.
Because Professor Gewirtz dealt exclusively with desegregation decisions and
examined resistance by both public and private actors, however, his focus was both
narrower and much broader than mine. For a more recent exception that focuses on
interactions between the Supreme Court and state courts with regard to arbitration,
see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The UnconscionabilityGame: StrategicJudging and the Development of Arbitration Doctrine, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=l 114977.
3 For surveys of the literature, see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394-96 (2007), and Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of
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mitted as they generally are to the view that legal reasoning and legal
doctrines are merely means by which judges seek to advance their policy aims, 4 these scholars have been unable to advance a convincing
explanation for why their own studies almost invariably find high
5
levels of compliance.
This Article is different. Like the political scientists, it takes seriously the challenge the Supreme Court faces as it attempts to control
lower court behavior. 6 But, like most legal scholarship, it also
presumes that law actually matters. Building on those premises, this
Article's central arguments are the descriptive claims that (1) the
Supreme Court has at its disposal a number of doctrinal 7 tools that

can be used to shape and direct lower court behavior, and (2) a number of recent developments suggest that the Court does in fact seek to
use legal doctrine in this way. This Article does not, however, attempt
to answer the difficult normative questions about whether the Court
should behave in such a way.

Appeals, in
eds., 1991).

THE AMERICAN COURTS 35, 43-46

(John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson

4 See Kim, supra note 3, at 384.
5 See id. at 396-404 (reviewing political scientists' explanations and identifying
problems); see also Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD.

369, 371-78 (2005) (same).

6 I recognize that "the Supreme Court" is a continuing collective body whose
members have no direct influence over the appointments process and little ability to

control otherJustices; I also recognize that the necessity of rendering group decisions
imposes serious limitations on the Court's ability to develop a coherent set of principles. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court,95 HARV. L. REv. 802,
813-23 (1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 83 (1986). Despite the inevitable risks of distortion, I will, for ease of
clarity, largely ignore group dynamics within the Court itself, citing as only partial
defense the fact that scholars who have examined the nature of the Court as a group
decisionmaker have generally assumed away the existence of lower courts entirely.
See, e.g.,
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence,12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 169, 170 (1992) (assuming "the judicial system consists of a single court
that decides all cases").
7 This Article uses "doctrine" in the broad sense of including not only various
"rules" or "tests," but also procedural and administrative directives to lower courts.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the "Doctrine," 114 HARv. L. REv. 26,
79 (2000) (noting that to decide cases under the Constitution "judges will offer interpretations of its meaning, give reasons for those interpretations, develop meaningful
interpretations, develop mediating principles, and craft implementing frameworks
enabling the document to work as in-court law" and defining doctrine as encompassing "[t]hese interpretations, reasons, principles, and frameworks").
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The Supreme Court can seek to improve its control over lower
court outcomes in two general ways. 8 First, the Court can aim to channel a trial court's initial decision. Second, it can increase monitoring
by itself and other reviewing courts. 9
The Court has numerous techniques for influencing trial court
decisions. Because complicated or open-ended standards increase the
risk of good faith misunderstandings and create opportunities for disguising deliberate noncompliance, the Court may be better served by
laying down simple rules whose application depends on only a few
factors. The Court can also bar trial courts from relying on criteria it
deems irrelevant or too difficult to verify on appeal-such as, for
example, the presence or absence of a particular state of mind-and
it can enforce these rules of exclusion by imposing upon trial courts
duties to explain their decisions. Finally, the Court can nudge trial
courts towards a favored result or away from a disfavored one by
adjusting the background legal baseline (such as whether a particular
type of law is presumed unconstitutional) or by adjusting the level of
proof necessary to dislodge it.
On the monitoring side, there is likewise a great deal the Court
can do. It can expand the availability of appellate review by creating
exceptions to the final judgment rule-a review-limiting doctrine that
generally bars an appeal until a trial court has issued a decision that
"ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the
court to do but execute the judgment."1 0 It can increase the intensity
of appellate monitoring by characterizing certain issues as presenting
questions of law rather than questions of fact and by otherwise adopting nondeferential standards of appellate review. And the Supreme
Court can enforce the restrictions it imposes on trial courts' initial
determinations by adopting appellate presumptions-such as one that
8 As is generally the case with taxonomies, these two categories are not entirely
distinct. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
9 Both of these strategies are, at least in principle, available to any appellate
tribunal seeking to increase its control over trial court outcomes. I focus on the
Supreme Court for two reasons. First, the literature I seek to engage has tended to
focus on that Court. Second, the situation confronting intermediate appellate courts
is complicated by the fact that their efforts to secure greater control over trial court
outcomes are themselves subject to override by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734-35, 1739-43 (2007) (rejecting an attempt
by the Federal Circuit to specify in greater detail the manner in which federal district
courts should decide whether invention was "obvious" for purposes of federal patent

laws).
10 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. Co. v. S. Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1883)).
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all trial court errors have an adverse effect on a verdict-to be applied
when those directives are not followed.
All of the strategies just mentioned share certain overlapping
downsides. Some techniques-including, to varying degrees, all of
them that seek to control a trial court's initial decision-can be difficult to use well without possessing the sort of information that the
Justices may have a difficult time gathering. Other strategies-most
notably rules and significant adjustments to the required proof levelrisk generating new undesirable outcomes even as they work to prevent certain others. Some strategies raise concerns about legitimacy,
and still others can be difficult to implement or costly to apply and
enforce.
In addition, no strategy for increasing Supreme Court control
over lower court outcomes is foolproof. All of the techniques discussed in this Article rely on the assumption that basic norms regarding appropriate judicial behavior (including, most especially, the one
that lower court judges will not simply lie about the basis for their
decisions 1 ) have at least some constraining effect.' 2 In addition,
sheer numbers alone will always preclude fully effective monitoring of
trial courts by intermediate appellate courts or of those appellate
courts by the Supreme Court itself. 13 Far from making the extravagant claim that legal doctrines alone can generate perfect Supreme
Court control of lower court outcomes, this Article will simply advance
the more modest one that they represent one underappreciated tool
for doing so.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I will
describe the challenges the Supreme Court faces in attempting to
control lower court outcomes. Part II will turn to legal doctrine,
describing a number of ways in which the Court can use it to shape
and direct lower court behavior and discussing the relative advantages
and disadvantages of each. Part III will apply the insights of Part II to
recent developments in three areas of public law-the constitutional
law of punitive damages, the rules governing "officer suits" against
state officials, and the concept of "reasonable" searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. These examples, it will argue, suggest
11 Cf David L. Shapiro, In Defense of JudicialCandor, 100 HARV. L. RE-v. 731, 750
(1987) ("[T]he fidelity ofjudges to law can be fairly measured only if they believe
what they say in their opinions and orders .... ").
12 Cf McNollgast, Politicsand the Courts: A Positive Theory ofJudicialDoctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995) (stating that authors "do not wish to
deny in total the notion that law school education and legal experience produce a
judicial temperament' that influences decisions by judges").
13 See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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that Supreme Court attempts to control lower court behavior are very
much alive and illustrate why the Court might sometimes choose one
strategy for doing so over another. A brief conclusion will identify
some implications of this analysis and suggest areas for future
research.

I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PROBLEM

"Ifmen were angels," James Madison wrote, "no government
would be necessary."' 4 Something similar is true of the relationship
between the Supreme Court and lower courts. If a lower court judge
was nothing more than "the simple (and perhaps simple-minded)
enforcer of the Supreme Court's dictates"1 5 -or if appellate review
were perfectly accurate, costless, and instantaneous-there would be
no need for the Justices to consider the possibility of good faith error
or deliberate lower court resistance when formulating legal doctrines.
But that is not the world in which we live. Indeed, as this Part
explains, the Supreme Court cannot simply assume that lower courts
will implement the Court's decisions in a manner that a majority of
16
Justices would view as correct.
Although the degree to which lower courts do or do not follow
Supreme Court precedent is "[u]ltimately . . . an empirical" question,1 7 any fully successful demonstration of the risk of lower court
noncompliance must, at least for now, be largely conceptual rather
than entirely empirical. 8 Fortunately, such a framework already
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 32 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15 Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and PottedPlants: "Inferior"Judgesand the Task of
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993). Professor Levinson's
piece criticizes, rather than defends, this common supposition.
16 Because this Article views matters from a top-down, Supreme Court-focused
perspective, its sole test for assessing the correctness of a lower court decision is
whether it is the outcome that would be reached by a majority of fully informed Justices. This Article offers no method for how the Justices themselves should decide
cases, nor any metric for assessing whether their decisions are correct.
17 Cross, supra note 5, at 398.
18 Because the Supreme Court has almost total freedom in deciding what cases it
will hear, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 468, 1580 (5th ed. 2003), one cannot take its raw
reversal rate as representing the Justices' views about overall lower court behavior.
And despite a number of high profile counterexamples involving the white-hot issues
of federal versus state supremacy, see, e.g.,
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872); race, see, e.g., J.W.
PELTASON,

FIFrY-EIGHT

LONELY MEN

7 (1961); 22 Negroes Fined in Bus Bias Case, N.Y.

Mar. 22, 1957, at 14 (discussing an Alabama state court judge who refused to
follow a Supreme Court ruling that segregation of municipal busses was unconstitutional); and religion, see, e.g.,
Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128
TIMES,
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exists, one originally developed to analyze economic organizations but
since applied to a number of public actors, including judges: principal-agent theory.' 9
Broadly speaking, a principal-agent relationship exists whenever
one person or group (a principal) must rely on others (agents) to
accomplish the principal's goals. 20 Reliance on others has two disadvantages vis-A.-vis a do-it-yourself approach. First, the agent may be less
skilled at performing her assigned tasks than the principal would have
been, be it because of less training, ability, workload, or lack of sufficient direction from the principal. 21 Second, principals and agents
22
will likely have at least somewhat different preference structures.
These twin disadvantages, in turn, create "agency costs"-the deadweight loss created by the fact that agents are inevitably somewhat
23
imperfect proxies for their principals.

(S.D. Ala. 1983) (holding, in conceded contravention of decades of Supreme Court
precedent, that "the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution does not prohibit [a] state [government] from establishing a religion"),
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983),
affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), instances in which lower court judges claim to be doing
anything other than making a good faith attempt to apply existing high court authority are basically nonexistent. Accordingly, one could not obtain a fully accurate
empirical measure of the extent of lower court noncompliance without devising some
method for determining what a majority ofJustices would think about cases the Court
never hears and then applying that technique to some appropriately selected subset
of all lower court rulings. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL.
261, 271 (2006) (highlighting the dangers of ignoring unpublished opinions when
attempting to draw general conclusions about judicial behavior).
19 By invoking principal-agent theory, I do not mean to deny that there other
existing theoretical frameworks, such as, for example, game theory that might illuminate important features about the relationship between the Supreme Court and lower
courts.
20 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
433-34 (1989); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal'sProblem,
63 AM. ECON. REv. 134, 134 (1973).
21 Of course, one reason principals retain agents is because they possess skills or
knowledge the principal lacks, though it may also be that the scope or complexity of
the activity in which the principal seeks to engage is beyond the capacity of any single
person. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization,28 AM. J. POL. Sci.
739, 756 (1984).
22 See, e.g., id.
23 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).
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If one conceives of the Supreme Court as a principal and lower
courts as its agents, 24 it is clear that the Court lacks the ability to

employ many of the methods traditionally used to address agency
costs. Take agent selection. Although Justices have sporadically
25
advised Presidents about the appointment of some federal judges,
they have no direct role in such appointments and no right to block
26
the appointment or promotion of any particular lower court judge.
Instead, state and lower federal court judges are appointed by a host
of independent political processes that may well select for things
other than ideological compatibility with Supreme Court preferences,
high judicial competence, or willingness to subordinate one's personal views to those of one's judicial superiors. 27 What is more,
because appointments tend to be made on a rolling basis, even a Justice who is confident that most lower court judges appointed at the
same time as her share her general views may still worry that those
whose service pre- or postdates hers may not merit that description.
And finally, because lower court judges generally hear cases either
alone or in panels of less than the size of the full court-and are
assigned to do so via processes over which Supreme Court Justices
have no control28-even a relatively small number of unreliable lower
24 Although this characterization is fairly standard among political scientists, see
Kim, supra note 3, at 386 n.13 (citing sources), it is nonetheless hardly free of controversy. In particular, Professor Pauline Kim has argued that viewing the relationship
between the Supreme Court and lower courts through a principal-agent framework
often rests on a series of unarticulated and difficult-to-defend normative presuppositions regarding the nature of the judicial hierarchy. See id. at 434-41. My use of the
principal-agent framework, however, is for the limited purpose of explaining why a
Justice who wants her own preferences followed has cause to worry about lower court

noncompliance. Of course, whether it is legitimate for a Justice to act on such concerns is a different matter entirely. See infra text accompanying notes 314-15.
25 See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 13, 159-60 (1979)
(reporting instances in which Chief Justice Burger offered advice to President Nixon
regarding judicial appointments); Walter F. Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower
Court Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J. POL. 453, 459-73 (1962)
(detailing efforts by Taft to influence judicial appointments during several
administrations).
26 See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving to the president the power to appoint
"with the Advice and Consent of the Senate").
27 See generally Nina Totenberg, Will Judges Be Chosen Rationally?, 60 JUDICATURE
92, 93-97, 99 (1976) (describing the selection process for federal judges as it existed
in the middle part of the twentieth century).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2000) ("Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its
panels in such order and at such time as the court directs."); id. § 137 (authorizing
federal district courts "having more than one judge" to divide cases "as provided by
the rules and orders of the court").
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court agents will have the potential to affect the outcome of a great
many cases.

Not only do the Justices lack the ability to select their lower court
agents, their ability to incentivize what they would regard as good performance is limited at best. Judges on a given lower court are generally paid the same amount, and their level of compensation is
determined by the jurisdiction (federal or state) in which they sit and
their position within that judicial hierarchy rather than their level of
compliance with Supreme Court decisions. 29 The Justices cannot fire,
demote, transfer, or financially penalize bad lower court judges 30 any
more than they can promote or give raises to good ones. They cannot
order that a specific lower court judge be precluded from hearing
certain kinds of cases, even if the judge in question has repeatedly
shown herself to be an unreliable executor of Supreme Court policy.
In theory, the Justices could hold a particularly recalcitrant lower
court judge in contempt, but the Court has never done so, and it has
threatened it only a handful of times. 31 Reversals accompanied by
sharp criticism may have some effect on lower court behavior, 32 as
may affirmances accompanied by effusive praise, but the success of
these techniques depends on the sensitivity of particular lower court
judges to Supreme Court feedback (and the public attention that
often accompanies it), as well as the likelihood of monitoring in any
given case.
Perhaps the biggest problem, however, is that the Court simply
lacks the capacity to monitor more than a tiny fraction of lower court
decisions. First, there is the matter of raw numbers. The Supreme
29 See id. § 44(d) (setting a single salary for federal circuit judges); id. § 135 (setting the salary for federal district judges); see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2
(1993) ("[A]lmost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and other
terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives . .

").

30 I mean "bad" solely in the sense of being poor agents of the Supreme Court.
31 The most recent example was in 1969, when the Supreme Court considered a
motion for an order to show cause why an Alabama state judge should not be held in
contempt for violating an order issued by the Court in a voting rights case. See In re
Herdon, 394 U.S. 399, 399-400 (per curiam). Although Justices Douglas and Harlan
would have granted the motion, see id. at 400-03 (Douglas, J., dissenting), a majority
voted to stay consideration pending a determination of whether the same judge had
violated an earlier order by federal district court, id. at 399 (majority opinion).
32 See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 104-06 (1964). At
least one study, however, has found that a district judge's "reversal rate" has no effect
on likelihood of promotion. See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 137 (1980).
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Court itself has never issued more than 298 merits decisions in a single year,3 3 and in recent years it has generally issued around 80. 3 4 In
2005 alone, nearly 1000 federal district judges 35 disposed of more
37
than 300,000 cases 36 and nearly 30,000 state trial court judges
resolved nearly 19,000,000 cases.38 It is true that the Justices can get
help from the thirteen United States courts of appeals and various
intermediate state appellate courts, which handed down 61,975 and
240,957 decisions in 2005, respectively. 3 9 But even these other appellate courts, the numbers make clear, cannot possibly review anywhere
near all trial court decisions, and, at any rate, Supreme Court reliance
on other appellate courts to monitor trial courts simply introduces
another principal-agent relationship-one between the Supreme
40
Court and the members of those other appellate courts.
33 The year was 1886. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 228
tbl.3-2 (4th ed. 2007).
34 See, e.g., David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in
the CertiorariProcess, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 964-65 (2007) (book review). For various
explanations of why the Court has been deciding so few cases during recent years, see,
for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking Docket, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at
64, 64-65; Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1363, 1366-77 (2006); and Stras, supra, at
965-96. Although it can be no more than a guess, another possible, albeit partial,
explanation may be an increasing preference to shape the course of lower court decisionmaking through the front-end creation of doctrine rather than the more timeconsuming back-end process of direct monitoring by the Justices themselves.
35

See

ANALYTICAL SERVS. OFFICE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL

tbl.1.1 (2006) [hereinafter FACTS AND FIGURES], available at http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf
(reporting
that there were 642 active and 292 senior federal district court judges in 2005).
36 See id. tbl.6.1 (reporting that federal district courts terminated 338,314 cases in
2005).
FACTS AND FIGURES

37

COURT

STATISTICS

PROJECT,

NAT'L CTR.

FOR STATE

COURTS,

STATE

COURT

2006, at fig.g (2007) [hereinafter COURT STATISTICS PROJECT],
available at http://ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006-files/StateCourtCaseload
Statistics2006.pdf (reporting that there were 11,349 state trial court judges sitting on
general jurisdiction courts and 18,161 sitting on limited jurisdiction courts in 2005).
38 Id. tbl.1 (reporting that in 2005, 9,871,127 civil and 9,474,354 criminal cases
were disposed of by state trial courts). The state court numbers are misleadingly high,
however, because the only state court cases the Supreme Court may review are those
that include a contested issue of federal law. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
590, 603-07 (1875).
39 For data on the United States Courts of Appeal, see FACTS AND FIGURES, supra
note 35, tbl.2.1. For state courts of last resort, see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, supra
note 37, at 153 tbl.10.
40 One technique the Supreme Court can use to address its principal-agent problem vis-a-vis the courts of appeals or state supreme courts is the summary reversal, a
procedure whereby the Court issues a single order and opinion that both grants certiCASELOAD STATISTICS,
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To make matters worse, factors other than sheer numbers further
hinder appellate courts' ability to monitor trial courts and the
Supreme Court's ability to monitor either. Appellate courts cannot
review any lower court ruling unless the losing party files an appeal
(or, in the case of the Supreme Court and many state courts of last
resort, multiple appeals). Even if a litigant who receives an unfavorable ruling from a lower court determines that an appeal is worth the
cost, a number of generally applicable doctrines-including, most
notably, the final judgment rule and deferential standards of reviewoperate to limit the effectiveness of appellate monitoring. 4 1 And even
if noncompliance is detected, there is little tangible an appellate court
can do other than change the outcome of that particular case, and
often the necessity of further factfinding or the availability of other
42
bases for decision will conspire to prevent even that.
II.

LEGAL DOCTRINE AS A TOOL FOR SUPREME COURT CONTROL

So what's a poor Supreme Court Justice who wants to exert at
least some control over lower court outcomes to do? She might daydream about the power to hire and fire lower court judges, 43 or even
to set their salaries. She might wish for the ability to reorganize cerorari and reverses a lower court decision without the benefit of briefing and oral
argument. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam).
Not only is this procedure less costly in terms of Supreme Court time and resources
than full merits consideration, its summary nature may itself send a stronger signal to
the lower courts. On the other hand, as the numbers cited in the text reveal, the
Supreme Court simply lacks the capability to engage in any sort of monitoring of the
vast majority of even appellate court decisions. Because my primary focus is on the
principal-agent problem between the Supreme Court and federal and state trial
courts, fuller consideration of the usefulness of summary reversals is beyond the scope
of this Article.
41 See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
42 Cf FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 517 (stating that even when the Supreme
Court reverses a state supreme court on a federal issue, the state court may simply
reinstate the initial judgment on state law grounds). For dated, but still fascinating,
examinations of the fate of Supreme Court decisions on remand to state courts, see
Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1954); Note, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and
Remanded by the Supreme Court, October Term, 1931, to October Term, 1940, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 1357 (1942); and Note, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates,
56 YALE L.J. 574 (1947).
43 See, e.g., Burke Shartel, FederalJudges-Appointment, Supervision, and RemovalSome Possibilities Under the Constitution (pts. 1 & 3), 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 488 (1930);
id.
at 870, 875 (arguing it would be constitutional to have " [a]ppointment of inferior
federal judges by the judiciary branch itself" and asserting it would be constitutional
to authorize the federal judiciary to remove "unfit" judges).
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tain structural features of the United States judicial system, perhaps
eliminating the state courts44 or changing the number of layers of

appellate review or the allocation of resources between trial and
appellate courts.4 5 But let's take current institutional arrangements as
given: there is actually quite a lot the Justices can do to shape and
direct lower court behavior.
The source of this power lies in the Court's ability to formulate
and later to adjust legal doctrines based on the perceived risk of lower
court noncompliance. Speaking broadly, a Justice who wants to limit
the number of outcomes with which she disagrees can employ one of
two approaches: (1) aim to shape and direct the underlying merits
determination; or (2) lower barriers to effective monitoring by the
Court itself or trusted appellate courts.
There is obviously a great deal of overlap between these
approaches. Techniques that channel the primary merits decision
can also facilitate monitoring by making nonconforming decisions
easier to spot. And strategies that focus on removing obstacles to
effective monitoring can reduce the number of initial errors if, as
commonly believed, lower court judges generally dislike being
reversed. 46 In fact, one of this Part's key objectives is to demonstrate
how the various strategies that the Supreme Court can use to increase
its control over lower court outcomes overlap with, and are-at least
to a certain extent-substitutes for, one another.
A.

Shape the Initial Decision

A trial court 47 can reach a result other than the one a majority of
Justices would desire for one of two main reasons. First, the trial court
may misunderstand or misapply the standards laid down by the
44 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118
n.48 (1977) (arguing there are deeply entrenched differences between state and federal courts).
45 Cf Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 859-74 (1984) (describing six
models of setting up a judicial system and various values served by each); Steven
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means ofError Correction,24J. LEGAL STUD. 379,412-24
(1995) (discussing rationales for permitting appeals and for generally limiting appellate review to two layers).
46 See, e.g.,
Calvert Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate
Court, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1958) ("I don't enjoy getting reversed any more than any
other judge ....").
47 In reality, the point made in the text applies not only to trial courts, but also to
intermediate appellate courts engaged in nondeferential review of earlier trial court
decisions. Because the next subpart focuses on doctrines directed exclusively at
reviewing courts, I will, for clarity's sake, generally speak in this subpart of tactics that

aim to control a trial court's initial decision.
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Supreme Court and thus commit legal error. Second, even perfectly
faithful application of the Supreme Court's directives may sometimes
48
produce what a majority of Justices would regard as a bad outcome.
To make matters even more complicated, the Justices may see certain
kinds of bad outcomes as worse than others, as reflected by the adage
that it is "better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer. '49 Accordingly, perhaps the biggest challenge facing a Justice
who seeks to influence lower court behavior is how to craft doctrines
that will minimize the number of legal errors while simultaneously
avoiding at least the most objectionable sorts of bad outcomes.
The risk that an initial decisionmaker will commit legal error is
largely a function of what Professor Maurice Rosenberg termed "primary" discretion-the extent to which the trial court is empowered to
make "a wide range of choice [s] . . . free from the constraints which
characteristically attach whenever legal rules enter the decision process."'50 The most obvious way to reduce the number of legal errors,
therefore, is to limit this discretion by placing restrictions on the number of factors a trial court may consider or the range of outcomes it
may reach.
The most familiar strategy for reducing an initial decisionmaker's
primary discretion involves use of rules rather than standards. Although
the distinction invariably grows fuzzy around the margins, standards
typically call for a situation-specific, all-things-considered type inquiry
whereas rules direct consideration of a relatively small number of factors and prescribe rigid consequences based on their presence or
absence. To use a familiar example: "no one shall drive faster than is
safe under the circumstances" is a standard; "Speed Limit 55" is a
5
rule. 1

The existing literature about the choice between rules and standards has generally neglected its implications for the relationship
48 Again, by "bad outcomes," I mean simply those a majority of Justices would
regard as undesirable. To cite a classic nonjudicial example of what most people
would regard as a bad outcome: a prohibition on lying would, if strictly followed,
require telling a killer the location of his intended victim. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant,
On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, in GROUNDING FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63, 63-64 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 3d
ed. 1993) (1799) (discussing an argument made by Benjamin Constant).
49 WILLIAM BLACSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358; see generally Alexander Volokh, n
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 174-77 (1997) (discussing the "Blackstone Ratio").
50 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SVRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971).
51 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992).
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between the Supreme Court and lower courts. 5 2 That said, it is easy to
see why a Justice concerned about lower court compliance may often
prefer to set forth legal doctrines in rule form.5 3 As a number of
prominent scholars have pointed out, perhaps the fundamental characteristic of decisionmaking by rule is its ex ante character: the
rulemaker performs a before-the-fact assessment of all relevant considerations and then declares what consequences should follow in a wide
variety of circumstances.5 4 Because the Supreme Court is so rarely the
initial decisionmaker in any case, 55 its own power is enhanced-and

lower courts' primary discretion is reduced-when the Justices formulate legal doctrines in such a way as to make as many of the hard
choices as possible at the doctrine-creation phase. 56 In addition,
reducing the number of facts that may be considered and restricting
52 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 10-12 (1991) (noting generally that "modern legal systems often avoid the use of mandatory rules"); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 257 (1974) (dealing generally with "the degree of precision or specificity with
which a legal command is expressed as a determinant of the efficiency of the legal
process"); Kaplow, supra note 51, at 557 (setting forth an "economic analysis of the
extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or standards");
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1713-24 (1976) (analyzing the choice between rules and standards in relation
to values of "individualism" and "altruism"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.L. REV. 22, 62-69 (1992) (focusing on general
arguments favoring rules or standards in the creation of constitutional doctrine and
the importance of group dynamics within the Supreme Court itself). For a notable
exception, see Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 274 (2006)
("[T]he United States Supreme Court can and should sometimes calibrate its role to
provide different types of guidance depending on whether an area of law is governed
largely by rules or by standards.").
53 Of course, a Justice might prefer to use rules for other reasons, including a
desire to provide greater certainty to primary actors or even because of that particular
Justice's assessment about the nature of the rule of law. See generally Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (exploring "the
dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion").
54 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 51, at 559-60; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 961 (1995).
55 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 268-318 (discussing the Court's "original"
jurisdiction).
56 See SCHAUER, supra note 52, at 159 (noting that "[r]ules ...operate as tools for
the allocation of powe'). For the same reason, rules may seem attractive to a justice
who wants to influence the outcome of future Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g.,
Scalia, supra note 53, at 1179-80, though one must confront the impressive body of
social science research suggesting that Supreme Court Justices are, at the very least,
highly resistant to efforts at doctrinal control. SeegenerallyJEmREYA. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REViSITED 94-96 (2002)
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an initial decisionmaker's options (both characteristics of rules) will
tend to reduce the number of good faith mistakes and facilitate more
57
effective monitoring by reviewing courts.
So why not use rules all of the time? The answer is that ruleslike every other strategy for increasing Supreme Court control over
lower court outcomes-have costs as well as benefits. Indeed, in the
case of rules, the downsides are basically the advantages in reverse,
and they will often be substantial.
For one thing, Justices can confront serious informational barriers
when attempting to formulate rules. Because rules seek, in effect, to
resolve certain categories of cases before they arise, it can be hard to
create good ones without extensive information. 58 A Justice may lack
adequate understanding of the current state of affairs in the lower
courts, and find it hard to predict the precise consequences of various
possible rules on lower court behavior. Even if these problems can be
overcome, the Justice may find it difficult to express her own preferences in terms of just a few basic criteria, to say nothing of the challenges posed by trying to anticipate what she will think about
59
situations that have not yet even arisen.
A related drawback of rules-one they share with all strategies
that rely on contracting a trial court's primary discretion-is that they
tend to reduce the number of legal errors only at the cost of generating new bad outcomes. Rules gain their power to control lower court
decisionmaking by constricting the range of relevant information and
limiting a trial court's ability to take account of situation-specific equities in choosing what course to follow. By doing so, however, rules
almost inevitably generate situations in which the outcome dictated by
(noting that the lack of political accountability and absence of a superior judicial
body limit the ways to control the decisions of the Justices).
57 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower
Federal Courts, and the Nature of the 'Yudicial Power, " 80 B.U. L. REv. 967, 990 (2000)
if
("Because lower courts are rarely willing to explicitly flout binding precedent ....
the Supreme Court were to establish and explicate clear, doctrinal rules with determinate consequences, such rules might be quite effective in actually binding lower court
decision-making and limiting the avoidance of precedent."); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23, 39
(2000) (noting that even if initial adjudicators can engage in bad-faith manipulation
of rules as easily as they can with standards, "errors in rule application will tend to be
more obvious and, therefore, more susceptible to correction on appeal").
58 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 52, at 267 (making a similar observation).
59 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994) (identifying "relative
indeterminacy of aim" as one of "two connected handicaps" that afflicts efforts "to
regulate unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general
standards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions").
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the rule's application does not further-and may affirmatively contradict-the purposes that led to the rule's creation in the first place,
and the frequency of such occurrences will generally increase as the
rule grows simpler and more determinate. 60 Assuming that at least
one reason why ajustice would seek to control lower court behavior is
to maximize the overall number of what she would regard as correct
outcomes, the prospect of generating new bad ones would seem to be
61
cause for serious concern.
A third downside is largely unique to the use of rules. Rules often
have at least two audiences-an out-of-court actor, whose conduct the
rule governs, and the officials who will later decide whether the rule
has been violated. 62 Because there is rarely perfect "acoustic separation" between these two audiences, 63 there may be situations in which
even a rule that is well designed to control lower court decisionmaking may have undesirable impacts on nonjudicial actors. Take, for exam-

ple, the Supreme Court's decision in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin,64 which addressed how best to operationalize the principle that a person detained without a warrant must receive a judicial
hearing "'promptly after arrest."'' 65 Although the Court's rule-like
holding-that hearings held more than forty-eight hours after arrest
are presumptively invalid-undoubtedly limits a trial court's primary
discretion, it may also, the Court's contrary protests notwithstanding,66 be seen as giving executive branch officials free rein to decide
when within the first forty-eight hours such hearings should be held.
Finally, use of rules may sometimes raise concerns about legitimacy.
Justice Scalia may be correct that it is often possible to construe "even
the most vague and general text" as having "some precise, principled
content. '"67 In some situations, however, the controlling legal text
may be phrased so broadly as to make it difficult for the Court to
characterize creation of a clear rule as an act of judicial "interpreta60 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 52, at 268; Sunstein, supra note 54, at 990.
61 A Justice might find rules attractive for reasons other than maximizing the
number of correct outcomes, such as ensuring similar outcomes for similarly situated

litigants.
62 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 52, at 261; Sunstein, supra note 54, at 960.
63 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 631 (1984).
64 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
65 See id. at 52 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
(1975)).
66 See id. at 56.
67 Scalia, supra note 53, at 1183.
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tion," and doing so may instead, at least to some people, begin to
68
resemble an act of impermissible judicial "legislation."
For all of these reasons, rules may not always be an attractive
option for a Justice seeking to limit trial courts' primary discretion.
What should not be overlooked, however, is that there are a number
of other possible options.
A second strategy involves what I will call rules of exclusion.69 As
explained earlier, rules operate by taking a relatively small number of
facts and making their presence or absence outcome determinative.
Rules of exclusion are more limited: they tell an initial decisionmaker
not to consider certain facts. To cite a fairly well-known example,
when the Supreme Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce70 that
although trial courts may impose a longer sentence following a second
trial for any number of reasons, they may not do so to punish the
defendant for having taken a successful appeal, 7 1 it was announcing a
rule of exclusion. Another example would be situations in which the
Supreme Court has barred consideration of a party's subjective
72
intent.
As a strategy for increasing lower court control, rules of exclusions' chief selling point is that they permit the Supreme Court to
obtain at least some of the benefits of rules while minimizing the
downsides. Rules of exclusion can increase the number of initially
correct lower court decisions by barring resort to considerations that
the Justices have concluded will, more often than not, lead lower

68 The classic debate here is the one regarding the legitimacy of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Compare, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in Criminal Procedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 107-11 (1985)
(arguing that Mirandais illegitimate), with David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 191-95 (1988) (arguing that Mirandais legitimate), and
Berman, supra note 1, at 114-65 (same). Although my own sympathies are with
Professors Berman and Strauss, this Article need not take sides in that dispute.
Rather, my more limited point is that under virtually any interpretive theory there are
at least some doctrinal moves that are deemed out of bounds.
69 Professor Ehrlich and Judge Posner would say that what I call rules of exclusion are simply comparatively less precise rules. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 52,
at 258 ("A rule withdraws from the decision maker's consideration one or more of the
circumstances that would be relevant to decision according to a standard."). As
explained in the text, however, there are several important distinctions between rules
and rules of exclusion when used as tools of ensuring greater Supreme Court control
over lower court decisionmaking.
70 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
71
72

See id. at 723-26.
See infra notes 224-27, 290 and accompanying text.
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courts in the wrong direction, 73 or are too likely to lead to a particular

type of disfavored result. Rules of exclusion can also facilitate monitoring by precluding trial courts from relying on variables whose presence or absence is particularly hard to verify on appeal or whose
precise significance would be hard to confirm or refute based on a
cold record. Although they do require some effort to formulate and
may generate some new bad outcomes if the forbidden consideration
has even a slight connection to the underlying purpose of the inquiry,
rules of exclusions' more limited nature means that they will generally
require less information to create than rules, and the negative impact
of excluding a single variable from consideration will generally be less
severe than making the entire decision turn on just one or two facts.
Finally, rules of exclusion will rarely suffer from serious legitimacy
problems, because the Court can simply construe the underlying constitutional or statutory provision as making the excluded fact legally
74
irrelevant.
Rules of exclusion, of course, are no panacea. For one thing, the
very characteristic that will often make them less problematic than
rules-that is, their more limited nature-will also make them relatively less effective at securing lower court decisions with which a
majority of Justices would agree.
Rules of exclusion also have another downside vis-d-vis rules, one
they share with virtually every other technique for enhancing
Supreme Court control over lower court decisionmaking. As compared with rules, rules of exclusion can be both hard to implement and
costly to apply and enforce. It is comparatively easy to determine whether
the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a trial court's conclusion that a driver was going ninety miles per hour in a fifty-five
zone and whether the fine it imposed was the one set by the governing
statute. But absent an on-the-record declaration, it will often be both
challenging and time consuming to deduce whether a trial court
relied on a forbidden consideration in reaching an otherwise permissible result.
One way to address this last problem is to couple rules of exclusion with a third strategy and to impose a duty of explanation. Indeed,
the Supreme Court did precisely that in Pearce, the case that held that
trial courts may not seek to punish defendants for taking successful
73 See SCHAUER, supra note 52, at 150 ("Often we fear that some class of decisionmakers, whether through unconscious bias or conscious ill-will, cannot be trusted to
take certain types of factors into account.").
74 See, e.g., infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text (discussing decisions barring lower courts from considering a defendant's subjective intent in ruling on
motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity).
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appeals.7 5 Citing the need "to assure the absence of such a motivation," 76 justice Stewart's majority opinion stated that a trial judge who
decides to impose an enhanced sentence must make an on-the-record
declaration of her reasons. 77 The main advantages of this strategy
should be obvious. Duties of explanation require little information to
adopt. And, at least standing alone, they are extremely unlikely to
generate new bad outcomes.
But duties of explanation also have their downsides. For one
thing, the explanation may well not be forthcoming unless the duty is
backed up by an appellate presumption, a review-expanding technique
discussed in the next subpart, 78 and one possessing its own problems.
In addition, it will often be easy for a trial judge who seeks to avoid
reversal to say that she is not relying upon any forbidden considerations, and hard for a reviewing court to tell if she is lying. And if all
that is not enough, many people view judicially imposed duties of
explanation as having serious legitimacy problems. 79 Although seemingly everyone agrees that the Supreme Court may prescribe tests for
determining whether a given governmental act violates the Constitution, a number of Justices have argued that the Court simply has no
legitimate authority to tell state courts how they must go about explaining their decisions.80
What if the Supreme Court wants to influence the course of initial trial court decisionmaking, but concludes that the techniques discussed so far would be impractical, unwise, or ineffective if imposed
alone? At least two options remain.
75 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
76 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
77 See id.
78 See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
79 A number of statutes and Federal Rules impose duties of explanation on federal trial judges. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (directing a
federal district court charged with sentencing a criminal defendant to "state in open
court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence"); FED. R. CRIM. P.
12(d) (directing federal district courts to make express findings of fact when ruling
on pretrial suppression motions); id. 12(f) (requiring federal district courts to record
findings of fact or conclusions of law made during a proceeding). In addition, the
Fourth Amendment imposes a duty of explanation on federal and state judges alike.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV (stating that all "Warrants" must "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized").
80 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 740-41 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Professor Amy Coney Barrett has recently gone further and challenged the Court's seemingly well-settled authority to impose duties of explanation on lower federal courts
pursuant to its "supervisory power." See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the
Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 324, 360-66 (2006).
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A fourth strategy for controlling a trial court's primary discretion
is to adjust the baseline presumption.8 ' By "baseline presumption," I
mean the background principle that controls in the absence of legally
cognizable evidence to the contrary or when the evidence is in equipoise. Baseline presumptions can be broad and general, or narrow
and context specific. To cite an example of the former: the baseline
presumption in all criminal litigation and at the threshold of virtually
all civil suits between private parties is that the defendant is not liable.
In contrast, the baseline presumption can ping-pong back and forth
several times: governmental activity is generally presumed constitutional,8 2 unless it implicates constitutionally protected rights,8 3 unless
the person whose rights are being affected is in prison, 8 4 or unless the
right in question is the one to be free from purposeful race
discrimination.

85

Standing alone, baseline presumptions have both limited downsides and a limited capacity to influence lower court decisionmaking.
Unlike rules or rules of exclusion, setting a baseline presumption does
not require the Court to be able to specify in advance that any particular facts may-or may not-be considered. In addition, because a
legal system simply cannot function without ways for deciding what
happens absent proof to the contrary, 86 neither the difficulty of choosing the appropriate presumption nor the risk that picking the wrong
ones will generate additional bad outcomes can justify-or even make
possible-failure to select one. For similar reasons, it is difficult to
lodge legitimacy objections against the use of presumptions (at least
of the "rebuttable" kind8 7 ), though there may be situations in which
81 Of course, presumptions-like burdens of proof, the next technique I discuss-have other uses besides influencing lower court decisionmaking. Most obviously, they also serve to advance substantive policies, such as the facilitation or
avoidance of certain preferred or undesirable outcomes.
82 See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901).
83 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
84 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
85 SeeJohnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511-12 (2005).
86 Cf Berman, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining that because courts invariably
"lack[ ] unmediated access to the true fact of the matter," they must by necessity
adopt certain "decision rule[s]" to help them deal with epistemic uncertainty).
87 One of Miranda's leading academic critics argued that the Supreme Court
lacked authority to establish "conclusive" presumptions, though he viewed "rebuttable" presumptions as constitutionally unproblematic. SeeJoseph D. Grano, Miranda's
Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 179
(1988) (asserting that conclusive presumptions are illegitimate); Grano, supra note
68, at 141 n.271, 141-48, 156 (asserting that rebuttable presumptions are legitimate).
For a period that spanned the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court
invalidated a series of laws on the theory that they rested on impermissible "irrebut-
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either a controlling legal text or widespread and longstanding practice, such as in criminal prosecutions, would make it difficult to justify
setting the presumption in one particular way. And finally, although
there can be situations in which it can be difficult to figure out which
of several possible presumptions should apply,8 8 once the appropriate
presumption is identified, it is comparatively easy for trial courts to
assess, and appellate courts to monitor, whether there is no evidence
to dislodge it.
At the same time, however, baseline presumptions alone are a
fairly limited tool for securing greater Supreme Court control over
trial court decisionmaking. It is a comparatively rare situation in
which there is literally no evidence that is even arguably relevant with
respect to an important point in litigation. And it may be even rarer
to find a situation in which the evidence that does exist is self-evidently in equipoise.
Baseline presumptions can become quite a bit more effective,
however, when paired with a fifth and final strategy for shrinking a
trial court's primary discretion: raisingthe level ofproof necessary to justify a departure from the presumptive state of affairs. Sometimes
these adjustments are overtly framed in terms of the burden of proof,
such as the requirement of clear and convincing evidence in certain
libel cases8 9 or proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials.9 0
Other times, they are framed in terms of levels of scrutiny, such as the
requirement that a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute regulating economic activity must demonstrate that there is no set
of facts that could even arguably justify the law. 9 '
As a strategy for limiting a trial court's primary discretion, the
chief upsides of adjusting the level of proof should be largely familiar
by now. Raising proof requirements should push all but the most
recalcitrant trial judges in the favored direction and ease monitoring
table presumptions" about a person's ability to work; interest in, or ability to engage
in, parenting; or other factors. See, e.g.,
Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law
Condemns": ConstitutionalSex DiscriminationLaw as a Questfor Perfect Proxies,85 CORNELL
L. REv. 1447, 1466-69 (2000) (discussing the cases within this timespan in which "the
Court insisted on individualized adjudication rather than reliance on overbroad
presumptions").
88 CompareJohnson, 543 U.S. at 505-15 (holding that strict scrutiny is the proper
standard of review for a prison's race-based policies), with id. at 528-32 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing whether a case involving racial segregation in prisons was
governed by the presumption that race-based classifications are unconstitutional or by
the presumption that prison regulations are constitutional).
89 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
90 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
91 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955).
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by reviewing courts. 92 Not only can this technique thus be particularly
useful to a court seeking to avoid certain kinds of particularly disfavored outcomes-such as, for example, convicting the innocent-but
there are even situations in which increasing the required level of
proof "can, perhaps counterintuitively, reduce" the total number of
undesirable outcomes. 93 Finally, unlike rules, adjusting the level of
proof does not require specifying all relevant considerations in
advance, and, unlike rules of exclusion, it does not even require saying that any particular facts may not be considered.
At the same time, playing with proof levels is a blunt-force tactic,
one that can easily generate as many problems as it solves. Levels of
proof that deviate farthest from the preponderance standard will generally be most effective in influencing trial court behavior and facilitating appellate monitoring, but they will, at least in general, also
generate more new bad outcomes. 9 4 On the other hand, less severe
adjustments will tend to have a lesser impact on trial court decisionmaking and make it harder and more costly for reviewing courts to
monitor compliance. And to make matters worse, because the overall
impact of any particular adjustment will depend on both the number
of trial court errors that were occurring before the change and the
circumstances that produced those errors in the first place, there can
be serious informational barriers to setting the optimal proof level.
All of the strategies discussed so far-rules, rules of exclusion,
duties of explanation, baseline presumptions, and adjustments to the
level of proof-directly regulate proceedings in trial courts. In so
doing, they seek both to reduce the initial number of trial court errors
and to ease their detection by appellate courts. But there is another
family of techniques the Supreme Court may use when it seeks to
92 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003)
(reversing a state supreme court's invalidation of a state tax law under rational basis

review).
93 Berman, supra note 1, at 140. In general, "[i]f the goal is to minimize the
number of erroneously decided cases ....
the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule
emerges as the superior choice." Neil Orloff &Jery Stedinger, A Frameworkfor Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-EvidenceStandard, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1159, 1172 (1983). But
this reasoning, Professor Berman has explained, "crucially depends on the assumption that the factfinder's degree of subjective confidence regarding a given factual
proposition ... accurately corresponds to the statistical probability that that proposition is true." Berman, supra note 1, at 139. In contrast, if the Supreme Court has
reason to believe that lower courts "systematically overestimate or underestimate the
probative value of a particular type of evidence, or are otherwise systematically biased
for or against a particular class of litigant," id. at 140, a heightened proof standard can
reduce the total number of bad outcomes.
94 See supra note 93.
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increase its control over lower court outcomes: those that aim to eliminate barriers to effective appellate monitoring.
B. Increase Appellate Oversight
Trial courts do not always have the last word, but a number of
doctrines frequently give them "a right to be wrong without incurring
reversal. '9 5 Accordingly, another strategy the Supreme Court may use
to control lower court outcomes is to limit what Professor Rosenberg
called "secondary" discretion-"the degree of finality and authority a
96
lower court's decision enjoys in the higher courts.
A certain amount of secondary discretion is both inevitable, given
present institutional arrangements, and desirable on its own terms. It
is inevitable because the ratio of trial to appellate judges makes it
impossible for appellate courts-much less the Supreme Court
97
itself-to engage in full-scale monitoring of every trial court ruling.
And it is desirable because monitoring is costly and time consuming
for judges and litigants alike and because even the most self-confident
Justice would probably agree that there are certain kinds of decisions
98
that trial courts are more institutionally well-qualified to make.
The ultimate form of secondary discretion would be to make all
trial court rulings entirely unappealable. But though the Supreme
Court has long stated and recently reaffirmed that there is no freestanding constitutional right to an appeal, 9 9 neither the federal government nor any State has gone that far. 0 0 What they do, however, is
employ a number of doctrines that shield many trial court rulings
from effective appellate scrutiny. For my purposes here, the three
most important sources of secondary discretion are the finaljudgment
rule, the adversity requirement, and deferential standards of appellate
review.
95

Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 637.

96

Id.

97 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g.,
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (discussing trial courts'
assessments of witnesses' in-court demeanor); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368
(1961) (stating that a trial judge may declare a mistrial when the "ends of substantial
justice cannot be [otherwise] attained"); Valdes v. Cent. Altagracia, Inc., 225 U.S. 58,
73 (1912) (discussing a trial judge's ability to grant a continuance in a civil case).
99 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron
Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1930).
100 See, e.g.,
Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously,
95 YALE LJ. 62, 62 & n.2 (1985) (noting that the federal government and all fifty
states provide some form of appeal).
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The first two doctrines are closely related. The final judgment
rule, 1 1 which is used in the federal system and most states, 10 2 generally bars an appeal until the trial court has entered a definitive ruling
in favor of one party, such as an award of damages to the plaintiff or a
dismissal of the entire case. 10 3 Because a great many cases settle or are
voluntarily dismissed before that point, a huge number of trial court
rulings-including those denying motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment-are never subject to appellate review at all. 10 4 The adversity requirement, in turn, bars appellate review unless the party seeking to challenge a particular ruling has suffered some legally
cognizable consequence as a result of it.105 In situations where the
final judgment rule is followed, this precept is generally interpreted to
bar an appeal unless the party on the losing end of the challenged
ruling was also on the losing side at the end of the litigation, 10 6 meaning that some demonstrably incorrect lower court rulings are not
reviewable even in theory.
Deferential standards of appellate review, in contrast, come into
play once an appeal is successfully taken. Their effect-indeed, their
purpose-is to give trial courts a degree of interpretive leeway. The
well-settled principle that a trial court's findings of historical fact will
not be disturbed absent clear error'0 7 and various doctrines stating
that other sorts of decisions will be overturned only in the event of an
"abuse of discretion"1 08 all constitute deferential standards of appellate review.
Because these doctrines can pose significant barriers to effective
monitoring, it should be unsurprising that a Justice seeking to gain
greater control over lower court outcomes may seek to modify them
(assuming, that is, that the Justice thinks the intermediate appellate
courts are, on balance, more likely to reach a good result than any
101

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).

102

See STEPHEN C.

YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE

627 (6th ed. 2004) (stating that

"[m]ost, but not all, states follow a similar pattern").
103 See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
104 See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw. L.J. 1045, 1079 (1990).
105 See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980).
106 See Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939).
107 See FED. R. Cry. P. 52(a)(6).
108 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477 (2003) (stating that a trial
court's decision whether to permit permissive intervention under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24 is subject to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review); Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (reasoning that a trial court's decision about how to determine the reliability of expert evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard).
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given trial court judge). Accordingly, a sixth strategy the Supreme
Court may use is to create exceptions to the final judgment rule, such as
when it held that rulings denying motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity are immediately appealable. 0 9
The upsides of such a strategy are obvious. The main one is lack
of informational barriers: like duties of explanation, simply authorizing more appeals requires no ex ante determination of whether certain facts should be dispositive (rules) or irrelevant (rules of
exclusion), or even whether and to what extent the inquiry should be
stacked in favor of one particular result (baseline presumptions and
adjusted levels of proof). In addition, strategies that rely on expanded
appellate monitoring should have little impact on incentives for nonjudicial actors, and they are less subject to manipulation by trial judges
than those that seek to contract the scope of a trial court's primary
discretion.
These sizeable advantages, however, come with severe downsides.
Anything that increases the overall number of appeals means reviewing courts will have less time to spend on each one. Permitting multiple appeals in a single case can lead to inefficient use of judicial time
and increases the risk that a reviewing court will be required to
expend time and resources resolving an issue that may have no impact
on the ultimate outcome of a particular case. Even if they are comparatively more likely to reach the correct result, intermediate appellate
courts will sometimes overturn trial court rulings that a majority of
Justices would have regarded as correct. Creating exceptions to the
final judgment rule also raises problems of legitimacy, both because
the statutes governing federal court jurisdiction specify very few
exceptions 1 0 and because it would difficult to identify any source of
authority for the Supreme Court to prescribe rules governing the timing of appeals in state courts. 1 Finally, assuming the Court is not
prepared to eliminate the final judgment rule entirely (a step that
would have huge costs and raise massive legitimacy problems), it will
need to expend further time and effort devising ways to decide which
interlocutory orders are nonetheless appealable and then enforcing
109 See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-45
(1993). Congress has taken a similar step in the criminal context, where the Double
Jeopardy Clause has been interpreted to bar governmental appeals after an acquittal.
See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)-(b) (2000); FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(f).
111 Cf Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 920-23 (1997) (declining to require state
courts to permit interlocutory appeals even in situations where the underlying action
was based on a federal statute and where an interlocutory appeal would have been
permitted had the case been litigated in federal court).
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those inevitably over- and underinclusive restrictions against litigants'
112
attempts to evade them.
Of course, having more appeals is likely to be of limited value if
the rules governing them require substantial (or even complete1 13 )
deference to the trial court. For that reason, a seventh strategy for
increasing Supreme Court control over lower court outcomes is to
lower the standardof appellatereview. When the Supreme Court has held
that various "constitutional facts" are subject to "independent examination" on appeal,' 14 it employed this technique.
Whereas the benefits of increasing appellate scrutiny are basically
the same as those of expanding the number of appeals, the downsides
are somewhat different. Neither legitimacy nor implementation is
likely to be a serious problem in most cases, because it is relatively rare
for either the Constitution or federal statutes to specify a standard of
review and because the standard's application is within the control of
the appellate courts themselves." 5 Instead, the biggest problems with
this approach are likely to be costs of enforcement (because truly
nondeferential review can be quite time-consuming for appellate
courts) and creation of new legal errors (because even time-strapped
trial courts may simply be better at performing certain kinds of tasks
than time-strapped appellate panels).
There are times, however, when neither increasing the availability
of appeals nor intensifying their focus will be enough to overcome the
difficulties an appellate court can face in attempting to understand
precisely what transpired before a different judge in another court112 See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)
(noting that applicability of the "collateral order" doctrine "is to be determined for
the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the

litigation at hand might be speeded or a 'particular injustic[e]' averted . . . by a
prompt appellate decision" (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988))).
113 According to Professor Charles Alan Wright, the once-prevailing rule was that
reviewing courts had no power whatsoever to review a trial court's refusal to grant a
new trial on the theory that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
758-60 (1957).
114 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11
(1984) (reasoning that whether a statement was uttered with the sort of "actual malice" that is required to support liability under N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), is subject to "independent appellate review"). See generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239-47 (1985) (discussing Bose).
115 See Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 641. But see infra note 162 (noting that the
Founders believed trial courts could, in some instances, disturb jury verdicts when
appellate courts would not be allowed to do so).
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room. In those situations, the Supreme Court can employ an eighth
and final strategy for increasing its control over lower court outcomes:
it can use (and direct intermediate appellate courts to apply) various
appellate presumptions.
An appellate presumption is simply a baseline presumption
directed at appellate courts rather than trial courts. To return once
again to Pearce, when the Supreme Court held that a trial court's failure to state on the record its reasons for imposing a longer sentence
following a second trial raises a presumption of vindictiveness on
appeal,' 1 6 it was announcing an appellate presumption.
As Pearceillustrates, one way appellate presumptions can increase
Supreme Court control is by helping ensure trial court compliance
with duties of explanation. But their usefulness expands beyond that
relatively narrow compass. Indeed, appellate presumptions can be
used to enforce nearly any restriction on a trial court's primary discre17
tion, as illustrated by the Court's holding in Chapman v. California
that any uncorrected constitutional error during a criminal trial must
be presumed prejudicial on appeal."18 Were Chapman's holding
firmly applied and consistently followed, 1 9 it would both simplify a
reviewing court's task and give trial courts an additional incentive to
get it right the first time.
At least in the criminal context, which is where both Pearce and
Chapman hold sway, the chief downside of appellate presumptions is
that they can be extremely costly to enforce. Judicial and litigant
resources are wasted every time a reviewing court requires further proceedings simply because a trial court failed to say the right thing or
because of an error that had no impact on the outcome. To make
matters worse, appellate presumptions may also lead to increased
costs for appellate courts by encouraging litigants who have suffered
116 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
117 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
118 See id. at 24. The opposite presumption applies when a federal court is entertaining a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993), a habeas petitioner cannot obtain relief based on even a conceded constitutional violation unless she "can establish that [the violation] resulted in 'actual
prejudice.'" Id. at 637 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)); see
also Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) (holding that Brecht applies in situations
where the state appellate courts did not recognize the constitutional error and thus
did not apply Chapman-style harmless error review).
119 For arguments that Chapman as applied has morphed into something quite
different than Chapman as announced, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not
Always Harmless: When Should Legal ErrorBe Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1176-77
(1995), and Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, HarmlessError, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 58-62.
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no concrete prejudice to nonetheless take an appeal. 120 Perhaps for
these reasons, the Supreme Court has shown itself quite reluctant in
recent years to adopt any such presumptions, either with respect to
122
12
trial court violations of duties of explanation ' or more generally.
As Judge Jerome Frank observed nearly sixty years ago, trial
courts will always have one inestimable advantage in any struggle with
their judicial superiors: the ability to find (and thus characterize) the
underlying facts-findings that for reasons of both necessity and
sound practice will almost always be accorded great deference on
appeal. 123 Given that reality, it is unsurprising that many of the techniques discussed in this Part can be thought of, at least in part, as
attempts to shrink that advantage. Rules restrict the number of facts
that are potentially significant. Rules of exclusion bar reliance on certain types of facts whose presence or absence can be particularly difficult to monitor. Presumptions and raising the level of proof change
the strength or type of facts required to justify a disfavored result.
Duties to explain and appellate presumptions attempt to force trial
judges to identify the facts on which they are actually relying, rather
than requiring reviewing courts to rule out all bases on which they
could possibly be relying. Expanded appellate review facilitates at
least some scrutiny of more trial court determinations, including factual ones. And lowering the standard of appellate review lessens the
deference owed to certain determinations that may otherwise be seen
as "factual" in nature.
At this point, it seems appropriate to move from possibilities to
actualities. Part I explained why the Supreme Court has reason to
worry about lower court compliance with its decisions. This Part
argued that there are a number of ways in which the Justices can craft
legal doctrines to address that risk. The next and final Part will iden120

See

ROGERJ. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR

50 (1970) ("Reversal

for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the
judicial process . .

").

121 See, e.g., United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63-74 (2002) (declining to presume prejudice based on a trial court's unobjected-to failure to engage in the full
colloquy required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11).
122 See, e.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2553 (2006) (holding that
even an objected-to failure to include an element of criminal offense in a jury charge
does not invariably mandate reversal); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)

(same).
123 SeeJEROME

FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 32, 223 (1949); accord Richard A. Posner,
JudicialBehavior and Performance:An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259,
1270 (2005).
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tify a number of discrete areas in which the modern Court appears to
have done just that.
III.

THE STRATEGIES EMPLOYED

The claim that the Supreme Court has sometimes crafted legal
doctrines based on mistrust of lower courts should be largely uncontroversial. Distrust of state courts, particularly southern state courts, is
generally viewed as an important theme of the Warren Court's
jurisprudence.

124

But distrust of lower courts did not end with the Warren-era Justices and it need not result in doctrines likely to please political liberals. To the contrary, this Part argues that there are at least three areas
in which the Supreme Court's recent actions suggest an attempt to
exert greater control over all lower courts and to nudge them in directions more consistent with political conservatism. Not only do these
developments suggest that concerns about lower courts are alive and
well, they also underscore that matters are far more complicated than
the familiar debates regarding rules versus standards and provide concrete illustrations of the relationships between various strategies for
increasing Supreme Court control over lower court decisionmaking.
Although my three examples are somewhat eclectic, there are
reasons for each choice. The first-the constitutional law of punitive
damages-supplies the clearest narrative of increasing frustration with
lower courts as a motivator for doctrinal development and suggests
that concerns about state courts are alive and well nearly four decades
after Earl Warren relinquished his seat. The second example-the
rules governing "officer suits" brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983125 -

shows that the Supreme Court is perfectly capable of fashioning doctrine based on mistrust of lower federal courts and of doing so when
interpreting statutes as well as the Constitution. The final examplethe concept of "reasonable" searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment-provides the most direct contrast with the Warren
Court and makes clear that a desire to rein in lower courts can just as
easily afflict a Court looking to narrow federal rights as to expand
them.
Two clarifications seem warranted at the outset. First, this Part's
approach is largely inductive. Ascribing motivations to a multimem124 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 524-28 (1963); Robert Jerome Glennon, The
JurisdictionalLegacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 869, 889-900 (1994);
Neuborne, supra note 44, at 1118 n.48.
125 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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ber body is difficult at best, 12 6 and it is made more so here by the fact
that norms ofjudicial behavior would seem to prevent Supreme Court
Justices from announcing that they are acting in a particular way
based, even in part, on distrust of lower court judges. Accordingly,
this Part must make the comparatively more limited claim that lower
court distrust is one fairly compelling explanation for an overall
course of decisions. Second, all of the decisions discussed in this Part
could be criticized on one ground or another. Because this Article is
largely descriptive, it takes no position regarding proper interpretive
methods, nor does it seek to defend the legal correctness or substantive wisdom of any of these decisions.
A.

Modern Efforts to Control State Courts: The Constitutional
Law of Punitive Damages

Punitive damages awards have long been subject to some sort of
judicial review for "reasonableness" in most United States jurisdictions. 12 7 But it is only recently that the Supreme Court has held that
the size of every such award is subject to federal constitutional restrictions. More so than in perhaps any other area, the development of
the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence during the last
several decades suggests an increasing frustration with lower courts in
general and state judiciaries in particular.
Although the Court has long asserted the power to control punitive damages awards in cases brought under federal causes of
action, 128 it has been far slower to do so when the underlying dispute
126 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
(suggesting that though "[e]ach member may or may not have a design," a multi-

member group such as a legislature "has only outcomes").
127 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 421-26 (1994) (reviewing history
from eighteenth-century England through modem practice).
128 See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (stating that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not authorize punitive damages against
employers based on "the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply
with Title VII'" (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting))); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144
(1985) (holding that the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
does not permit punitive damages against a fiduciary whose processing of an
employee benefit claim was improper or untimely); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) (holding that there are no punitive damages available against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964) (holding that the Federal
Labor Management Relations Act bars award of punitive damages based on illegal,
but peaceful, "secondary activities").
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is governed by state law. Indeed, as recently as 1989,Justice Blackmun
wrote for a unanimous Court that in situations "where state law provides the basis of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury may
' 129
consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law."
Notwithstanding that statement, the Court had actually begun
asserting some modest control over state law punitive damages awards
more than two decades earlier. In two decisions issued during the
mid-1960s, it construed the federal labor laws as implicitly forbidding
state law-based punitive damages in certain situations. 130 And in
1974, it held that the First Amendment creates special restrictions on
punitive damages awards in state law defamation actions. 3 1 But
despite saying some fairly critical things about punitive damages in
general, 13 2 these decisions were sharply limited in scope, tied as they
133
were to particular statutory or constitutional commands.
Starting in the 1980s, however, various opinions began intimating
that the Federal Constitution may impose more general restraints on
state court punitive damages awards. In 1986, a majority opinion that
had already resolved the case on other grounds went out of its way to
describe a party's argument that both the Due Process and Excessive
Fines Clauses limited state law punitive damages awards as raising
"important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be
resolved."' 13 4 Two years later, the Court granted review to consider
those issues, but failed to reach them after concluding that the appealing party had neglected to raise them with the state courts. 13 5 In so
doing, however, Justice Marshall's majority opinion described the
Excessive Fines Clause question as one "of some moment and difficulty,"' 3 6 and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion declared that
"there [was] reason to think" that the Due Process Clause imposed
13
restrictions on punitive damages.

7

129 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278
(1989).
130 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-66
(1966); Morton, 377 U.S. at 261.
131 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
132 See id. at 350 ("IJ]uries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.").
133 See, e.g., Morton, 377 U.S. at 260-61 (dealing with punitive damages in relation
to the congressional intent behind section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947).
134 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986).
135 See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988).
136 Id. at 79.
137 Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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The Court's next three punitive damages decisions were characterized by increasingly firm statements that the Federal Constitution
imposed at least some limits coupled with an apparent reluctance on
the part of a majority of Justices to identify precisely what they might
be. In 1989, the Court issued an opinion that pointedly noted that
the parties agreed "that due process imposes some limits on jury
awards of punitive damages,'13 8 but nonetheless declined to say more

because of the way in which the parties had litigated the case. 13 9 In a
separate opinion,Justice O'Connor claimed that " [a]wards of punitive
damages are skyrocketing," 140 criticized state appellate courts for sustaining punitive awards far higher than those upheld in even the
recent past, and stressed that "nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the
method by which they are imposed.'

41

142
Next came 1991's Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
where a five-Justice majority finally found a case where they deemed
the issues properly preserved and rendered an opinion that seemed
premised on the view that the Due Process Clause imposed both substantive and procedural restraints on punitive damages awards.1 43 But
although the Haslip Court stated that the punitive award "may be

close to the [constitutional] line,"'

44

it actually rejected five specific due

process attacks, including the claim that punitive damages should be
unavailable absent "clear and convincing" proof of wrongdoing. 145 In
addition, the Court stated that it "need not, and indeed ...

cannot,

draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every
138 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276
(1989) (emphasis added).
139 See id. at 260. Browning-Ferrisalso held that neither the Excessive Fines Clause
nor federal common law limited the size of state law punitive damages awards. See id.
at 278-80.
140 Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 Id. at 283.
142 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
143 See id. at 9, 23-24.
144 Id. at 23-24.
145 Id. at 23 n.11; see also id. at 17 ("[W] e cannot say that the common-law method
for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be
per se unconstitutional."); id. at 14 (rejecting the argument that it violates due process
to make a corporation vicariously liable in punitive damages for unauthorized actions
by its employees); id. at 19-22 (rejecting the argument that state court approved jury
instructions gave too much discretion to the factfinder); id. at 23-24 (rejecting the
due process attack on the size of the award).
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case." 146 In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the due process
issues raised by punitive damages were "ripe for reevaluation," in large
measure because changes in state law made them available in more
types of cases and because juries were returning, and appellate courts
14 7
were sustaining, far higher awards than they had in the past.
The apogee of the Court's "talk tough, do little" phase came in
1993's TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.148 For the first
time, a clear majority stated that a "grossly excessive" punitive award
would "violate the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause." 149 At the same time, the Court declined to upset a punitive
award that was 526 times the amount of the compensatory damages, 150 and its language seemed designed to preclude any serious
attempt to exert Supreme Court control over punitive damages.
Repeating Haslip's rejection of clear rules, Justice Stevens' plurality
opinion stressed that "a jury imposing a punitive damages award must
make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before it" and added that any
award that was the product of "fair procedures .. .is entitled to a
strong presumption of validity." 151 The plurality also declined to
adopt two proposed rules of exclusion, describing it as "well-settled"
that both a defendant's wealth and alleged wrongdoing in other parts
of the country may be considered both by juries in deciding whether
to impose punitive damages and by lower courts in deciding whether
152
to uphold such awards.
The first Supreme Court decision to vacate a state court punitive
damages award on due process grounds is not terribly well known.
And although the five million dollar punitive award in that case was
153
more than six times the already substantial compensatory damages,
the basis for the Supreme Court's action was not that the punitive
figure was necessarily too high; nor did the Court hold that it had
been based on improper information or imposed pursuant to an
improper standard of proof. Rather, 1994's Honda Motor Co. v.
146 Id. at 18.
147 Id. at 61-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
149 Id. at 458 (plurality opinion); see id. at 479-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The plurality does not retreat today from our prior statements regarding excessive
punitive damages awards .... It is thus common ground that an award may be so
excessive as to violate due process.").
150 See id. at 453 (plurality opinion).
151 Id. at 457.
152 See id. at 462 n.28 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (majority opinion)).
153 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
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Oberg1 54 was a case about constitutionally compelled monitoring it
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Oregon State Constitution that had been interpreted to bar all judicial review of the size of a
15 5
jury's punitive damages award.
Because Oregon. was apparently the only state with this sort of
rule, Oberg's impact was necessarily quite limited. The same cannot be
said, however, of the decision that first made plain that there had
been a real shift in the Supreme Court's approach-its 1996 ruling in
1 56
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.
Gore is significant for two main reasons. One, it was the first time
the Supreme Court held that the sheer size of a punitive damages
award exceeded constitutional limits. Indeed, the Court did so
despite the fact that the Alabama state courts had already reviewed the
award using procedures whose constitutionality the Court had blessed
in Haslipand cut the size of the jury's award in half. 15 7 Two, although
Justice Stevens' majority opinion declared that the Court was still "not
prepared to draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally
acceptable punitive damages award,"' 58 it laid down three "guideposts" for assessing constitutionality and gave extensive (albeit largely
159
case-specific) guidance for their application.
Although the Court did not consider the substantive constitutionality of another punitive damages award for a number of years after
Gore, the pattern of increasing constitutional scrutiny of trial court
punitive damages rulings continued unabated. In 2001, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.160 held that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had erred in deferring to a trial
court's application of the three Gore "guideposts.'

6

' In doing so, the

Court brushed aside arguments that the appropriate size of a punitive
damages award presents an issue of "fact" that the Federal Constitution's Re-Examination Clause shields from scrutiny by a federal appellate court, 162 and described de novo appellate review as necessary to
154

512 U.S. 415.

155 See id. at 426-35.
156 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
157 See id. at 566-67.
158 Id. at 585.
159 See id. at 574-85.
160 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
161 See id. at 436.
162 See id. at 437-39. The Re-examination Clause provides that "no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Although this provision's
text does not speak to the relationship between different courts, the Supreme Court
has held that it incorporates the founding-era understanding that trial courts may
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to maintain control of and to clarify, the

legal principles."' 1 63 In short, whereas Gore focused on limiting a trial
court's primary discretion in entering judgment on a jury's punitive
damages award and did so by making the underlying constitutional
analysis somewhat more rule-like, Cooper Industries aimed to reduce
the level of secondary discretion created by mandating a nondeferential standard of appellate review.
Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that seemed
to embody multiple strategies for controlling state court punitive damages awards. Although Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbelp6 4 "decline [d] again
to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed," 165 it appeared to move the underlying constitutional test substantially further in the direction of a rule both by pointedly suggesting that ratios above 9:1 are presumptively suspect, 166 and
generally discussing each "guidepost" in such detail that Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of converting them into "marching orders"
for the lower courts. 16 7 State Farm also appeared to endorse at least
two rules of exclusion, stating that courts may not seek to justify punitive damages awards based on "unrelated" out-of-state conduct 68 or a
defendant's wealth. 169 In sharp contrast to the Court's earlier declaration in TXO, State Farm also suggested that the baseline presumption
was that any punitive damages award-even one imposed pursuant to
scrupulously fair procedures-is constitutionally suspect. 170 And
finally, without any acknowledgment that the earlier case had been
litigated in federal court or that the Due Process Clause had been
construed so as to confer no right to appellate review in the first
disturb jury verdicts in certain situations where appellate courts would not be permitted to do so. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432-34 (1996).
163 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added) (quoting Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)).
164 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
165 Id. at 425.
166 See id. ("[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
167 Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 421 (majority opinion).
169 See id. at 427.
170 See id. at 419 ("It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his
injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the
defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible
as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or
deterrence.").
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place, 171 State Farm flatly stated that Cooper Industries had "mandated"
that all appellate courts "conduct de novo review of a trial court's appli' 172
cation of [the Gore factors] to [a] jury's award."
17 3
The Court's decision last Term in Philip Morris USA v. Williams
is interesting for two reasons. The first is its actual holding: the Court
adopted another rule of exclusion, declaring that states may not use
punitive damages awards to punish (and courts may not seek to justify
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award by making reference
to) harms to third parties who are not before the court.1 74 But in
some ways even more interesting is part II of Justice Breyer's majority
opinion, which took pains to reassert, in almost bullet form, the main
1 75
holdings of Cooper Industries, Oberg, Gore, and State Farm.
It may be possible to tell several stories about the development of
the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. 176 A fairly
compelling one, however, would involve an increasing conviction that
juries had gotten out of control, and that at least some state courts
were unwilling to rein them in, either because the state court judges
were themselves sympathetic to large, redistributive awards against
largely out-of-state defendants, or because the political environment
in various states made state court judges reluctant to take action in the
absence of cover from the Supreme Court. 1 77 Starting with the
Court's 1938 abandonment of the "federal general common law" in
171 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930).
172 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
173 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007).
174 See id. at 1063-64.
175 See id. at 1062-63.
176 See, e.g.,
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, BackdoorFederalization,53
UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2006) (viewing constitutionalization of punitive damages as
part of a broader pattern of Supreme Court attempts "to capture the considerable
benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity and to protect an increasingly
unified national (and international) commercial market from the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state legislation"); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence,84
TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1146-52 (2006). Siegel uses a punitive damages example to support the claim that "it is impossible to understand the [Rehnquist] Court's complicated intellectual matrix without acknowledging and assimilating the Court's hostility
towards the institution of litigation and its concomitant skepticism as to the ability of
litigation to function as a mechanism for organizing social relations and collectively
administering justice." Id. at 1108.
177 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and
the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 418-24 (1989)
(discussing the irrelevance of a defendant's wealth to the goals of deterrence and
retribution).
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 78 and through the early years of what
some perceived as "revolutions" in consumer and mass tort litigation,179 the Justices were apparendy content to leave regulation of
punitive damages almost entirely to the state judiciaries, though they
made exceptions for two areas of special federal concern (labor and
libel).18 0 Then, starting with Justice O'Connor-herself a former
state court judge 1s l and normally a champion of judicial federalism 1 82-various Justices became increasingly concerned that at least
18 3
some state courts were not holding up their end of the bargain,
though Court majorities initially declined to do much about it.184 By
the mid-1990s, a majority ofJustices were finally willing to take action,
though their initial efforts involved invalidating one extreme example
ofjudicial abdication (Oberg) and overturning one outlier award in an
opinion that hewed close to the facts of the particular case (Gore). By
the early years of this century, however, the Court had grown bolder
and/or more fed up, as demonstrated by its substantial tightening of
the Gore "guideposts" (State Farm) and how the requirement that
reviewing courts undertake some scrutiny of punitive damages awards
178 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Before Erie, the Court had reviewed the permissibility
of punitive damages awards in diversity cases litigated in federal court. See, e.g., Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 110-11, 115 (1893) (setting forth
standards under which a railroad could be held liable for punitive damages based on
the behavior of the conductor towards a passenger).
179 See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
180 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
181 SeeJoAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 2 (2005).
182 See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (beginning the opinion for the Court in a capital case by noting that the "case was about federalism" and
"concerns the respect the federal courts owe the states and the states' procedural
rules"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O'Connor and Federalism, 32 McGEORGE L.
REV. 877, 878 (2001) ("There is no doubt that federalism is integral to Justice
O'Connor's constitutional philosophy .... ).
183 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 280 (1989) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private parties.");
id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
large awards of punitive damages as detrimental to research and development of new
products); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Mississippi
Supreme Court's grant of "wholly standardless discretion" to the jury in determining
the amount of punitive awards as inconsistent with due process).
184 The epitome may be the following statement from the Haslip majority opinion:
"We note once again our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild.'" Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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morphed into a command to performing exacting appellate review
(Cooper Industries).
At the same time, developments in this area also nicely illustrate
the tradeoffs of, and the relationships between, various strategies for
controlling lower court behavior. Although the Court's doctrines
have certainly grown much more determinative during the last fifteen
years, as recently as 2003 it declined to impose a firm bright-line rule,
whether because a majority of Justices have decided that hard rules
are impractical in this area i 8 5 or because there is no majority for any
given one. Unable to coalesce around a simple and easily policeable
requirement, the evidence suggests that the Justices have increasingly
employed various other strategies, including rules of exclusion, shifting the baseline presumption, and expanding appellate review.
If vigorously implemented by appellate courts, the present system
may be adequate to ensure meaningful control over juries and trial
courts. Damages are rarely awarded until the conclusion of trial court
proceedings. The stakes involved in such cases are likely to make an
appeal worthwhile. And the well-settled rule that a reviewing court
lacks the power to increase a punitive damages award1 86 means that
187
the risks of fighting such awards will usually point in one direction.
When all of these factors are coupled with the prospect of de novo
appellate review, defendants' incentives to take appeals are quite
high.
But all of this starts with a pretty big "if." Indeed, the primary
downside of the Court's current approach is that it rests almost
entirely on the willingness and ability of state appellate courts to serve as
proxies for the Supreme Court itself. In situations where the plaintitFs cause of action is created by federal law, either party may generally decide to have the case heard and decided by the lower federal
courts,1 8 8

and it has long been argued that one of the primary reasons

for the development of the "modern" post-conviction writ of habeas
corpus was to permit the Supreme Court to enlist the lower federal
185 Cf Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
("The judicial function is to police a range, not a point.").
186 See David Baldus et al., ImprovingJudicialOversight ofJury Damages Assessments: A
Proposalfor the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1995).
187 If a trial court has reduced a jury's punitive damages award, though not as
much as the defendant would have liked, filing an appeal does carry some risk,
though in that case it is likely that the plaintiff will appeal even if the defendant does
not do so.
188 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)
jurisdiction).

(original jurisdiction); id. § 1441(a) (removal
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courts to help ensure compliance with its revolutionary criminal procedure decisions. 18 9 In contrast, punitive damages are most often
awarded in cases governed by state law and in situations where ordinary preclusion principles would preclude a "collateral" attack in a
new federal court proceeding. 190 Accordingly, the Supreme Court is
the only federal court authorized to consider the constitutionality of
most punitive damages awards, 19 1 and the highly fact-dependent
nature of even the post-State Farm "guideposts" and the massive constraints on their time to review certiorari petitions 192 mean that there
is little the Justices can do under the present regime to ensure appellate court compliance other than throw out an occasional outlier
award.
So what will happen if a majority ofJustices continues to perceive
that state courts have been insufficiently responsive to its aim to rein
in punitive damages awards? At some point, the Justices may find
themselves sufficiently informed to formulate-and willing to bear the
costs of implementing-a rule, and either impose an absolute or presumptive ratio with respect to compensatory damages that punitive
awards may not exceed or hold that punitive damages are categorically unavailable in certain circumstances or absent some specified
findings. The Court could also squarely hold that punitive damages
are presumptively unavailable as a constitutional matter, or revisit
another one of its earlier rulings and hold that punitive damages may
not be imposed absent clear and convincing evidence of sufficiently
culpable conduct. 193 Having mandated de novo appellate review of
punitive damages awards, the Court could conceivably require special
verdict forms so that reviewing courts could have the benefit of the
jury's actual basis for decision rather than a trial court's attempted
189 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 273-77
(1988) (asserting that the Supreme Court realized that direct review of state criminal
convictions did not constitute meaningful review and so turned to the writ of habeas
corpus to ease the pressure on direct review).
190 Cf Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1987) (holding that a federal court should have abstained from considering a constitutional attack on the largest punitive damages award ever rendered as of that date).
191 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 613-14 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
192 For a dated but still marvelous illustration of just how little time the Justices
have, see Henry M. Hart,Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of theJustices,73 HARV. L. REv. 84

(1959).
193 Cf Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.ll (1991) (noting that
while much is said to be in favor of a "clear and convincing evidence" standard, a
standard of "reasonably satisfied from the evidence" when buttressed by procedural
and substantive protections is constitutionally sufficient).
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reconstruction, or hold that the Constitution itself requires a stay of
execution of judgment until any appellate review is complete.
Regardless of what happens going forward, however, the events
that have already transpired illustrate the usefulness of thinking about
distrust of lower courts as a motivating factor in the creation of
Supreme Court doctrine. And as the next subpart demonstrates, the
distrust need not be limited to state judiciaries or play out in the constitutional arena.
B.

Reining in Federal Trial Courts: Constitutional Tort Suits

The previous subpart told a fairly familiar story from the Warren
era-increasing distrust of state courts leading to constitutionalization
of matters traditionally governed by state law-about far more recent
developments in the punitive damages context. But though it has
often been believed that the lower federal courts are generally better
agents of the Supreme Court than their state counterparts, 1 94 that
does not mean the Justices have been willing to assume perfect compliance by the former. Indeed, as this subpart explains, recent developments in at least one area may be best explained as efforts to
control lower federal courts in general-and federal trial judges in
particular.
Citizens who believe their constitutional rights have been violated
have long been able to sue for money damages. Although sovereign
immunity shields the government itself from suits brought by individuals, 195 it is well established that there is generally no sovereign immunity problem with suing the appropriate government official in her
"personal" capacity, even for actions performed on the government's
behalf. 196 These actions are generally known as "officer suits."
For much of our nation's history, well-settled jurisdictional principles meant that suits seeking money damages from state officials
almost invariably had to be litigated in state court under state-supplied
rules. 19 7 The plaintiff would accuse the defendant of committing
some traditional common law wrong, such as trespass, assault, or false
imprisonment. The defendant would answer by claiming "official
privilege"-that is, government authorization-as a defense. The
plaintiff would respond by invoking the superior authority of the Federal Constitution and arguing that it stripped the defendant of her
194
195
196
197

See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 44, at 1124-25.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1890).
See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991).
In contrast, actions filed against federal officers have long been removable. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 905.
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immunity, leaving her indistinguishable from any other lawbreaker.
But because the issue of federal law was not a necessary ingredient of
the plaintiffs "well-pleaded complaint," such suits could neither be
filed in federal court in the first instance' 98 nor removed there by the
defendant. 99 It also meant the plaintiff was required to fit her suit
into a state-law recognized cause of action, and to contend with any
20 0
restrictions state law placed on appropriate remedies.
All that changed in 1961 when the Supreme Court dusted off an
obscure federal statute, 20 1 and held that it authorized federal court
litigation under federally supplied rules in virtually every situation
where a citizen accuses a state official of violating her constitutional
rights. Enacted in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes "an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress" against any person who violates another's constitutional rights while acting "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory." 20 2 The principal question in Monroe v. Pape20 3 was
whether state officers whose conduct had violated the constitution
and laws of Illinois had nonetheless acted "under color of' that state's
law for purposes of § 1983, notwithstanding the fact that the state
20 4
courts stood able and willing to provide redress.
By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court said "yes." And although Justice Douglas' majority opinion is famously difficult to follow, 20 5 its rea-

soning appears to rest in large measure on distrust of state court
judges. Canvassing § 1983's legislative history, Justice Douglas reasoned that the statute aimed not only to "override certain kinds of
state laws" and to "provide[ ] a remedy where state law was inadequate," but also "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 20 6 But
198 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908).
199 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) (setting out the general rule that a case
may be removed only if the action could have been filed [originally] in federal court).
In fact, until Congress enacted § 1441 (a)'s predecessor in 1875, "no general grant of
removal jurisdiction in 'arising under' cases existed." FALLON ET ALt., supra note 18, at

905.
200
201

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 & n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
One commentator found only twenty-one reported cases brought under the

statute between its enactment in 1871 and 1920. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act:
Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26
202 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

203 365 U.S. 167.
204 See id. at 172.
205 See, e.g.,JOHN C.JEFFRIES, JR.

IND.

L.J. 361, 363 (1951).

ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 46-47 (2d ed. 2007)
(noting several ambiguities with respect to Monroe's reasoning).
206 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
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because Monroe's holding was that the federal remedy is always available, 20 7 this reasoning appears to make sense only if one posits a
profound and continuing distrust of state courts' willingness to vindicate federal constitutional rights and a corresponding desire to enable
such suits to be brought in the presumably more trustworthy federal
courts.208

That the birth of the modern § 1983 was founded in large measure on mistrust of state courtjudges is fairly well recognized.20 9 What
seems to have largely escaped commentary, however, are several ways
in which post-Monroe developments can be seen as motivated by concerns about federal trial judges.
Monroe largely removed state courts from the picture of what has
come to be called "constitutional tort litigation." 210 Because the plaintiff's cause of action is now supplied by a federal statute, these suits
may always be filed in federal court. 2 11 In addition, although the
Supreme Court later clarified that § 1983 actions can be filed in state
court as well-indeed, that state courts are generally required to
entertain them 2 2-it is also clear that defendants retain the option to
remove such suits to federal court. 213 Barring a mistake, therefore,
the Justices know the only way a § 1983 action will be litigated in state
court is if both parties choose for it to be there. And given that, the
only reason to employ any of the strategies described in Part II would
seem to be concerns about the abilities and propensities of the lower
federal courts.
Yet evidence of those strategies abounds in constitutional tort
jurisprudence, most notably in the context of doctrines governing
207 See id. at 183.
208 Another possible justification for Monroe's holding-though not one articulated by Justice Douglas-involves the difficulty of making case-by-case assessments
about whether state remedies are "adequate" and "available." SeeJEFFRIES ET AL., supra
note 205, at 46.
209 See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 44, at 1110 (describing Monroe as resting on
"thinly disguised assumptions of nonparity between state and federal courts").
210 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 643 (1987) (defining constitutional tort litigation as a
subset of civil rights litigation that "encompasses both actions brought against state
and local authorities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and similar actions brought against federal officials" (footnote omitted)).
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (stating that federal district courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States"); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.").
212 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 368-76 (1990).
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (2000).
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various "immunities." Not long after Monroe reinvigorated § 1983, the
Court began expressing anxiety that both ultimate damages liability
and the prospect of being forced to defend against time-consuming
and expensive lawsuits risked "over-deterring" vigorous and socially
desirable conduct by government officials. 214 In response to these
concerns, the Court developed various "immunity" defenses and has
continually refined the principles governing their application over the
succeeding decades.
The first set of questions involved the nature of the defenses and
the identity of the officials entitled to claim them. For a small group
of officials-the President of the United States, legislators, and
judges-the Court settled on a bright-line rule: absolute immunity for
all acts even arguably taken in the relevant capacity. 2 15 Although the
Court has acknowledged that this approach will shield some culpable
and socially undesirable conduct from legal consequence, it has
stressed the existence of alternate control mechanisms and the need
to give the relevant officials an especially wide field in which to oper21 6
ate free from judicial scrutiny.
In the main, however, the nature of the § 1983 context has made
it difficult to rely on rules as a strategy for controlling lower court
decisionmaking. Having interpreted § 1983 to authorize suits against
government officials for what the Justices presumably regarded as
good and sufficient reasons, it would seem perverse to hold that those
very same officials are all protected by an absolute immunity defense.
More generally, § 1983 is transsubstantive-that is, it authorizes suits
seeking to vindicate a wide variety of rights against a diverse array of
officials who act in an almost limitless variety of circumstances. Given
that characteristic, the informational costs of creating any across-theboard rules would be massive and even the best possible ones would
almost certainly be substantially over- and underinclusive with respect
to their underlying purpose of creating the socially optimal level of
deterrence.
214 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974). For the classic scholarly articulation of this point in the context of "street level" officials, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT

60-77 (1983).

215 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) ("[T]he President of the United
States is entitled to absolute immunity ....");see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S.
44, 44 (1998) ("Local legislators are entitled to... absolute immunity. ..."); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 361 (1978) ("[A] state districtjudge [is] entitled to
judicial immunity ....").
216 See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 52-53; Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751-53, 757; Stump, 435 U.S. at
363-64.
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For these reasons, it seems unsurprising that the Supreme Court
has generally chosen to articulate the scope of immunity defenses in
terms of standards rather than rules. More than three decades ago, it
made clear that the vast majority of government officials are eligible
for what has come to be called "qualified immunity."2 17 And although
the Court's precise articulation of the test has varied over the years,
the classic one is a quintessential standard: even government officials
who have violated a plaintiffs constitutional rights, the Court has
stated, "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 2 18
Of course, the main downside of an approach that asks whether a
given point of law was "clearly established" or what a hypothetical "reasonable person" should have known is that it gives a great deal of leeway to the initial decisionmakers-here, federal trial judges. That
said, the Supreme Court has taken a number of steps that seem
designed to facilitate effective monitoring of these decisions by the
courts of appeals.
Most notably, the Supreme Court has carved out a massive exception to the final judgment rule. Orders denying motions for summary
judgment are among the classic "interlocutory" orders generally
shielded from appellate scrutiny until all trial court proceedings are
complete. 2 19 Yet in Mitchell v. Forsyth,220 the Court held that orders
denying a defendant's request for summary judgment based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable. 221 Not only does Mitchell
substantially increase the odds that these types of summary judgment
denials will be subject to meaningful appellate scrutiny, the very existence of this unique review mechanism may encourage district courts
to grant more of the underlying motions in the first place.
The Supreme Court has also taken a number of steps to ensure
that the additional appellate monitoring authorized by Mitchell will be
as effective as possible. For one thing, it has announced a lowered
standard of appellate review. Notwithstanding the inherently factbound nature of whether the relevant law had been sufficiently established to give an officer "fair warning" that her particular conduct
217 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247; accord Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807
(1982).
218 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
219 See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTIICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2715, at 259-62 (3d ed. 1998).
220 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
221 See id. at 537.
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transgressed constitutional norms, 2 2 2 the Court has been adamant in
viewing the ultimate question as one of law that is reviewable de novo
2 23
on appeal.
In addition, the Court has adopted an important rule of exclusion that facilitates more effective appellate monitoring. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,224 the Court eliminated the requirement that a defendant
seeking qualified immunity must establish that she acted with subjective good faith. 225 In doing so, the Court later explained, Harlow rendered a defendant's state of mind "simply irrelevant to the qualified
immunity defense. ' 226 Although the Court's main stated justifications
for this innovation were that subjective inquiries are intrusive and too
often prevent "the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to
trial,"227 it may also be significant that disputes regarding a person's
mental state may be the situation in which trial courts' informational
advantage over reviewing courts is the greatest.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the Supreme Court has
also imposed what can be seen as a duty of explanation on all lower
courts. In a line of decisions culminating with 2001's Saucier v.
Katz, 228 the Court has insisted that lower courts confronting motions
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity must analyze
whether there has been a constitutional violation before proceeding
to consider whether the defense has been made out 22 9 -a ruling that

has been greeted with a pronounced lack of enthusiasm by many
2 30
lower court judges.
At the same time, developments in the constitutional tort arena
also underscore the limitations of, and downsides to, an approach that
relies predominantly on close appellate monitoring to secure trial
court compliance. In Johnson v. Jones,23 1 the Supreme Court unani222 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 761 (2002).
223 See, e.g.,Johnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (describing the question of
.what law was 'clearly established'" as presenting a "purely legal issue").
224 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
225 See id. at 813-17.
226 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998).
227 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-17.
228 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
229 See id. at 201.
230 Judge Pierre N. Leval, for instance, devoted a sizeable chunk of his recent
Madison Lecture to criticizing Saucier. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1249, 1275-81 (2006). On March 24, 2008,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearsonv. Callahan, No. 07-751, and directed
the parties "to brief and argue . . . 'Whether the Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz
should be overruled?"' Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008) (mem.).
231 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
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mously held that although a trial court's ultimate conclusions that a
constitutional violation occurred and that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable under Mitchell, the interpretations of fact on which
23 2
those conclusions are based are not subject to appellate scrutiny.
Though not denying that this holding will sometimes shield erroneous trial court rulings from appellate review, 233 the Court cited,
among other things, considerations of institutional competence and a
desire to avoid consuming vast quantities of appellate court time on
234
fact-dependent issues that may simply be resolved at trial.
Although the Supreme Court has relied mostly on monitoring
strategies in this context, it has not foresworn entirely attempts to
influence initial trial court decisions. Despite describing qualified
immunity as "an affirmative defense" on a handful of occasions, 23 5 the
Court has also suggested that it represents the baseline presumption
by describing the defense as "protect[ing] . . . all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 236 The Court

has also admonished trial court judges to be creative in using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to weed out claims before trial or extensive discovery to "protect[ ] the substance of the qualified immunity
defense."

237

But what if the Court concludes that presumptions and the occasional stern talking-to are not enough to move trial courts toward
greater recognition of qualified immunity? One option would be to
232 See id. at 319-20.
233 See id. at 309-10.
234 See id. at 316.
235 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 815 (1982); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 (1980).
236 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting this language); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (same); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1991) (same); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987) (same). In addition, at least five courts
of appeals have held that the plaintiff bears the burden of negating a defendant's
entitlement to qualified immunity. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why
the Court Should Look Beyond Summasy Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity
Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REV. 135, 136 n.9 (2007).

237 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597; see also id. at 597-601 (discussing how the trial
court should rely on summary judgment and other procedural devices to filter out
frivolous claims and thereby ensure "that officials are not subjected to unnecessary
and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings"); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 n.35
("Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of government as contemplated
by our constitutional structure, and 'firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' is fully warranted in such cases." (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

478, 508 (1978))).
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find additional ways to expand the scope of appellate review.
Although it is too soon to tell for certain, something along those lines
may have happened last Term in Scott v. Harris,238 a case arising out of

high-speed police chase that rendered a man a quadriplegic. 23 9 The
trial judge had denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, butJustice Scalia's majority opinion did
not follow what even it described as the "usual[ ]" course of "adopting ...the plaintiffs version of the facts." 240 Instead, it reasoned that
because the record contained "a videotape capturing the events in
question," it was appropriate for the Justices to view the tape and draw
their own conclusions about the true state of events. 24 ' Although
video records are obviously not available in all situations, Scott is far
from unique 242 and an increasing number of law enforcement and
other agencies appear to be videotaping encounters with the public. 243 In addition, Scott's reasoning could, in principle, be applied to

any situation in which a factual dispute is based in part on tangible
evidence-including memos, correspondence, or emails-that reviewing courts would be capable of examining for themselves.
Finally, if the Justices conclude that expanded appellate monitoring will not accomplish their aims, one might see a majority overcome
its apparent reluctance to impose more stringent limitations on trial
courts' initial decisions. Indeed, an effort to do so narrowly failed as
recently as 1998. As noted above, the Court's decision in Harlow eliminated any consideration of a defendant's subjective intent from the
qualified immunity analysis. 244 Yet there remain a few areas of constitutional law-most notably "cruel and unusual punishment" claims
under the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and
"retaliation" claims under the First Amendment-where a plaintiff
cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation without prov238 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
239 See id. at 1773.
240 Id. at 1775.
241 See id.
242 See, e.g., Stewart v. Prince George's County, 75 F. App'x. 198, 202-04 (4th Cir.
2003) (reversing the district court's denial of summary judgment in a § 1983 case
involving allegations of excessive force based heavily on the court of appeals' review
of a videotape of the encounter).
243 See, e.g.,
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 682-92 (1996); Lucy S. McGough, Good Enoughfor Government Work: The
Constitutional Duty to Preserve Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 2002, at 179, 186 (2002).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
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ing that the defendant acted with an impermissible motive. 245 The
question in Crawford-El v. Britton2 46 was how federal trial judges should

deal with motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in those circumstances.

247

The answer was fairly clear under existing law. Consistent with
orthodox summary judgment practice, the trial court should begin by
resolving any factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff and constructing
248
the most pro-plaintiff account reasonably supported by the record.
Accordingly, so long as the plaintiff presents some evidence that can
be read to suggest that the defendant acted with the requisite intent,
the court should assume the intent's existence and then ask whether
the defendant's actions violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights
and whether that violation would have been clear to a reasonable official as of the date in question.
But the problem with this approach, at least from the perspective
of a Justice who thinks qualified immunity furthers important social
policies, is that it can make it quite difficult to grant summary judgment. Because often "the required state of mind [will be] utterly
inconsistent with a reasonable belief in the legality of one's conduct"2 4 9-such

as, for example, a defendant whom a court must

assume purposefully discriminated against a member of a racial minority-resolution of the underlying factual issues in the plaintiff's favor
will often dictate denial of the defendant's motion.
Although the Crawford-El majority acknowledged that this intersection of summary judgment procedures and the standards for granting qualified immunity posed certain problems, 250 it also declined to
do much about them. Reasoning that any further procedural changes
would threaten to weed out meritorious suits2 5 1 and raise legitimacy

concerns in the absence of action by Congress or the appropriate
Rules Committee, 252 Justice Stevens' majority opinion expressed confidence that the best way to deal with the matter was to grant federal
245 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-40 (1994) (Eighth Amendment);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (First Amendment).
246 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
247 See id. at 577-78.
248 See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).
249 John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REv. 47, 56 (1998).
250 See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 584-86.
251 See id. at 591.
252 See id. at 594-97.
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trial judges "broad discretion in the management of the factfinding
process. "253
To the four dissenters, this "trust the district courts" approach
was wholly unsatisfactory. In an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist lambasted the majority for making a defendant's ability to obtain a quick dismissal "dependent on the varying
approaches of 700-odd district court judges"2 54 and proposed what

might be best characterized as a broad rule of exclusion: once a defendant offers a facially legitimate reason for the action being challenged, the Chief Justice argued, the only way a plaintiff should be
able to avoid summary judgment is by producing "objective evidence
that the offered reason is actually a pretext. ' 255 Justices Scalia and

Thomas would have gone further and imposed a firm rule: grant
immunity whenever the defendant can offer any "objectively valid"
reason for the challenged decision, regardless of any evidence of
25 6
invidious intent.

Although these arguments did not carry the day, Crawford-El
nicely illustrates the inescapable relationship between techniques for
increasing Supreme Court control over lower courts and the underlying substantive goals a Justice hopes to accomplish. The five Justices
in the majority may well believe that qualified immunity furthers
important social purposes and that district courts are sometimes too
slow to recognize the defense. But they also appear to believe, as Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion, that "[p]risoner
suits . . . can illustrate our legal order at its best," 257 and that dismissing a meritorious claim at the pleading stage would represent a
particularly bad outcome. In contrast, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that his proposed rule would impose a "severe restriction upon
'intent-based' constitutional torts," but wrote that he was "less put off
by that consequence than some may be" because he believed that "no
'intent-based' constitutional tort would have been actionable under
the § 1983 that Congress enacted."' 258 Accordingly, future developments in this area may well be influenced as much by the current
Court's attitude toward the regime spawned by its 1961 decision in
Monroe as by its sense for how faithfully the lower courts are implementing the doctrine that has grown up around it.
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

601.
610
602
612
601
612

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
(internal punctuation omitted).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Switching the Directionality:"Reasonable"Searches and Seizures

Despite their modern guise, the stories of the previous subparts
were familiar in one respect: like many of the most famous Warren-era
developments, 259 they involved the Supreme Court crafting doctrine
for the purpose of broadening and protecting federal law defenses.
But the link between distrust of lower courts and sympathy for federally protected rights is not inherent. In fact, as this subpart explains,
recent developments in an area closely associated with Warren Court
activism now seem to be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
ensure that lower courts are not too generous to criminal defendants.
With the possible exception of desegregation litigation, it would
be hard to think of an area in which struggles between the Supreme
Court and lower courts have played as prominent of a role as the constitutional law of criminal procedure. During the Warren era, the
Court not only constitutionalized (and thus federalized) huge swaths
of criminal procedure, 260 it also employed numerous techniques that
seemed designed to push trial courts to uphold more claims of federal
rights and to facilitate meaningful appellate review when they failed to
do so. The Court replaced a number of fuzzy standards with brightline rules that favored defendants. 26 1 It established strong presumptions that defendants wished to exercise their federal rights 2 6 2 and
that any violation of those rights was prejudicial and required reversal. 263 It imposed rules of exclusion and enforced them via duties of
explanation.2 64 It expanded its own ability to review state criminal
convictions by loosening the "independent and adequate state law
259 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
260 See generallyJoseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, HabeasAfter the Revolution,
1993 Sup. CT. REV. 65, 77-79 ("One might say that, in the criminal procedure context,
the Nationalist view of federal-state relations triumphed, and the Federalists were
routed.").
261 See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968) (holding that
certain categories of accomplice confessions are per se inadmissible during a joint
trial, thus overriding the discretion that trial courts typically enjoy under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 and comparable state rules); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that every indigent criminal defendant charged with a
felony is entitled to a state-supplied attorney).
262 See, e.g.,
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (overturning a capital
conviction because the record did not affirmatively show that the defendant had
knowingly and voluntarily waived several enumerated federal constitutional rights).
263 See, e.g.,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25 (1967) (holding federal constitutional errors require reversal unless shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt).
264 See, e.g.,
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
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grounds" doctrine. 265 And it enlisted the lower federal courts' aid by
massively expanding the federal post-conviction writ of habeas
266
corpus.
Revolutions often generate backlashes,26 7 and this one was no
exception. But although legal scholars have spent a great deal of time
debating to what extent the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
"retrenched" from the Warren legacy both in general 268 and in criminal procedure in particular, 26 9 I do not intend to join the fray.
Instead, the remainder of this subpart will focus on far more recent
decisions in one particular area-doctrines governing the "reasonableness" of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment-and
argue that they suggest an attempt to limit a federal trial court's ability
to suppress evidence offered against criminal defendants.
One potentially serious barrier to controlling pro-defendant trial
court rulings was removed long ago. Because the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause 2 70 has long been understood to bar government-taken appeals following an acquittal, 27 1 strict enforcement of the
final judgment rule in this context would have the effect of shielding
many trial court rulings from any appellate scrutiny. In apparent
response to this concern, both Congress and numerous state legislatures have enacted statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals from
265 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 92 (1966) (per curiam); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965).
266 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v.
Thompson, 522 U.S. 722 (1991); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 450 (1953).
267 See generally Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The
U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 751, 752-54
(1989) (examining the effect of Supreme Court rulings on public opinion); Michael
J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REv. 431, 452-82
(2005) (illustrating the "unpredictable, and occasionally perverse, consequences of
Supreme Court rulings").
268 For essays reviewing the Burger Court's work in a variety of areas, see THE
BURGER COURT (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
269 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2467-68 & nn.5-12 (1995) (collecting literature); id. at 2470-71 (summarizing Professor Steiker's argument that the
Burger and early Rehnquist Courts left largely undisturbed the various "conduct"
rules that the Warren Court had developed to regulate police practices while effecting
significant change in the "decision" rules that tell judges what to do in response to
various police conduct).
270 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
").
271 See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904) (applying this rule to
federal trials); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-97 (1969) (applying this
rule to state trials).
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trial court rulings that grant a defendant's motion to suppress evidence, 272 and the Supreme Court has construed the federal statutes
regulating its own jurisdiction as authorizing it to hear cases in which
27
such interlocutory suppression rulings are affirmed on appeal. 3
Merely authorizing appellate review, however, is not enough to
ensure effective Supreme Court control over trial court decisionmaking. In addition, the Court's task is further complicated by the fact
that even Justices who have expressed a strong general preference for
274
formulating legal doctrines in terms of rules rather than standards
have suggested that, given the near limitless variety of encounters
between citizens and police, a number of basic Fourth Amendment
concepts are "not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules.'"275

Based on statements like this, it would be easy to surmise that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is some sort of rule-free zone. But
that would be a serious mistake. In fact, during the last decade alone,
the Supreme Court has announced and expanded numerous clear
rules in the Fourth Amendment context. 276 It is "reasonable" per se,
the Court held in 1996, to pull over a motorist whenever an officer
has probable cause to believe that she has violated any traffic regulation, regardless of circumstances or severity.2 77 Once a car is pulled
over, the Court has further held that officers may always order both
the driver 278 and any passengers 279 out of the vehicle. In 2001, a fiveJustice majority held that the Fourth Amendment permits arresting
any driver whom an officer has probable cause to believe committed
any crime in the officer's presence-including misdemeanor offenses
272 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 9902(c) (1999).
273 See California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 498 n.71 (1966) (decided with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
274

See generally Scalia, supra note 53, at 1187 ("All I urge is ...

that the Rule of

Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows.").
275 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983)) (discussing the concepts of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause"); see also Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1777-78 (2007) (discussing the
concept of "reasonable force").
276 As the next several footnotes suggest, the Court first began employing this particular strategy in the 1970s and early 1980s. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 227, 257-85 (1984); Wayne R.
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures". The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 127-28.
277 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1996).
278 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam).
279 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997).
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such as failure to wear a seatbelt. 280 And once an officer has decided
to arrest, the Court has held that she enjoys an absolute entitlement to
search the car's entire passenger compartment as "incident" to that
arrest 28 1-a holding that the Court in 2004 extended to cover a situation in which the suspect was handcuffed in the back of a police
282
cruiser at the time of the search.
Given the sheer number of rules of the road and the ubiquity
with which we all violate them, these rulings render it constitutionally
permissible for police officers to stop and search the passenger compartment of almost any car at almost any time. 28 3 Of course, that fact,

standing alone, does not prove that these rulings were motivated by a
desire to control lower courts. Indeed, it might seem equally plausible
that their aim was the one invariably cited in the Court's opinions: the
need to provide clear guidance for police officers in the field.28 4

Although this account has a great deal of force, there is a serious
problem with treating it as the sole impetus for the Court's recent
decisions. Cops no doubt benefit from being given a list of things that
they may do. But if-as the Court has repeatedly stated-the basic
idea behind the exclusionary rule is to use the threat of suppression to
deter undesirable conduct, 28

5

there are also no doubt circumstances

in which the police would benefit from being given a list of things that
they may not do. But despite this fact, the Supreme Court has been
steadfast in refusing to create-or permitting lower courts to begin to
develop-any such lists. 28 6 Indeed, what is perhaps most notable

about the Court's recent use of rules in the Fourth Amendment context is their one-way character: the great bulk of them hold that a
particular type of police conduct is per se acceptable under the Federal Constitution. 28 7 More than perhaps any characteristic, this sug280 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
281 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
282 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 618-19, 621-24 (2004).
283 See David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car
at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 820-37 (2002).
284 See, e.g.,
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622-23; Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; Belton, 453 U.S.
at 458.
285 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
286 Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1777-78 (2007) (providing a definition of constitutionally "reasonable" force and refusing to apply a "magical on/off switch");
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-74 (2003) (applying a "probable cause" standard); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-75 (2002) (applying a "reasonablesuspicion" standard).
287 The main exceptions are two recent decisions holding that certain police
actions always constitute a "search" or "seizure." See Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct.
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gests that what may also be going on is an attempt to make it more
difficult for lower courts to suppress evidence based on Fourth
Amendment violations.
But what about situations for which a majority of Justices have
found themselves unable to agree on a rule of per se compliance with
the Fourth Amendment? There, recent decisions show use of two different techniques for controlling lower court decisionmaking that
mirror those discussed in the previous subparts, as well as a third that
illustrates a far more direct method for preventing lower courts from
granting relief based on disfavored rights.
For one thing, the Court has both emphatically stated and steadily expanded one very important rule of exclusion. As I explained
earlier, a trial court's ability to find and characterize the underlying
historical facts may pose the single greatest hindrance to effective
appellate monitoring, and this problem is particularly acute when the
underlying legal standard invites assessments about someone's state of
mind. 288 Accordingly, it should come as little surprise that just as the

Court eliminated such considerations from qualified immunity analyit has repeatedly stated that a police officer's beliefs, motives, or

sis,289

intentions generally "play no role in .

.

.

Fourth Amendment

analysis.
The Court also directed intensified appellate monitoring in its
critically important, but little noted, decision in Ornelas v. United
States.29 1 Although the Court has repeatedly emphasized the highly
fact-dependent and case-specific nature of both sorts of determina"290

2400, 2406-07, 2410 (2007) (determining that passengers in a car are "seized" at the
time the driver pulls over in response to a show of police authority); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-40 (2001) (holding that use of imaging technology to gather
details about the interior of a home not perceivable to an ordinary observer is a
"search"). In each of these circumstances, however, the conclusion dictated by the
rule does not compel exclusion of the resulting evidence; it simply directs the trial
court to conduct additional Fourth Amendment analysis. See Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at
2410; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
288 Cf supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in characterizing facts found by the trial court).
289 See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
290 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13) (finding the existence of
probable cause for a custodial arrest); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001)
(per curiam) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813) (same); Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (finding
the existence of probable cause for traffic stop); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
138-40 (1990) (discussing the scope of the "plain view" exception to the warrant
requirement); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (testing the "reasonableness" of a particular use of force without regard to "underlying intent or motivation").
291 517 U.S. 690 (1996).

2008]

DOCTRINE

FORMULATION

AND

DISTRUST

2099

tions, Ornelas nonetheless held that a trial court's assessment of the
legal significance of any particular fact and its conclusions about
whether the facts as a whole establish "reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. ' 292 Any other standard of review, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, risked creating
situations where otherwise similar cases could be resolved differently
29 3
depending how "'different trial judges draw general conclusions."'
And although it acknowledged that even de novo review had only a
limited ability to "unify precedent" in the absence of clear rules, the
Court stressed-in language upon which it would later rely to justify
the same conclusion in the punitive damages context-that "independent" appellate review was "'necessary if appellate courts are to main' 294
tain control of and to clarify, the legal principles."'
Even more recently, the Supreme Court has reminded us that
there is another technique it can employ if it concludes that lower
courts are too quick to grant relief based on a claimed violation of
federal rights. In 2006's Hudson v. Michigan,295 a five-Justice majority
held that violations of the Fourth Amendment's "knock-andannounce" rule do not require suppression of any evidence seized
during the subsequent search. 296 Although it went uncited in Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, Hudson bears a close resemblance to the
Court's decision thirty years earlier in Stone v. Powell.297 Ever since
Brown v. Allen,298 the general rule has been that prisoners who believe
their federal constitutional rights were violated during state court
29 9
criminal proceedings may seek relief from the lower federal courts.
In Stone, however, the Court created a special rule for Fourth Amend292 See id. at 699.
293 Id. at 697 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949)).
294 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001)
(emphasis added) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697)); see supra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text).
295 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
296 Id. at 2165-68 (applying a balancing test).
297 Compare id. (applying a balancing test in light of the fact that the "exclusionary
rule has never been applied except 'where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,'" and contending that in many cases where the exclusionary rule
is applied it is tantamount to a "get-out-of-jail-free card" (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91
(1976) (weighing "the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it
to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims" and noting that among these costs
is the risk of excluding "the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant").
298 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
299 See id. at 450 (finding that Congress did not intend "to eliminate the right of a
state prisoner to apply for relief by habeas corpus to the lower federal courts").
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ment claims, holding that arguments that unconstitutionally seized
evidence was wrongly admitted at the defendant's trial are simply not
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.3 0 0 Stone's approach has not
spread to other types of claims in the habeas context,30 1 and only time
will tell if Hudson has longer legs. Yet both cases demonstrate the
basic point that the ultimate way of preventing too frequent vindica30 2
tion of a disfavored right is to bar the granting of a remedy.
Especially in conjunction, these various developments suggest a
concerted effort by the Supreme Court to discourage lower courts
from suppressing evidence based on Fourth Amendment violations.
At the same time, other aspects of the Court's recent behavior underscore the challenges the Justices face in seeking to do so. Although
the Court is now regularly deciding only about eighty cases per
year, 30 3 during its last three Terms alone it has issued thirteen opinions
regarding the constitutional rules governing "searches and seizures,"
all but one of which it has decided in favor of the government litigant.3 0

4

Because the Court reverses or vacates far more often than it

affirms, 30 5 these numbers suggest that the Justices still perceive the
need to spend a relatively large amount of their own time engaged in
fact-bound review of lower court decisions that resolve Fourth Amend-

300 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
301 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 686-95 (1993) (refusing to extend Stone
to statements admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
302 Another example of this phenomenon would be the retroactivity doctrines that
the Supreme Court has developed to limit the ability of lower federal courts to grant
habeas corpus relief to state prisoners. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-10
(1989). For citations of some of the leading articles discussing and criticizing Teague
and its progeny, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1334-35 & nn.5-7.
303 See supra text accompanying note 34.
304 See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-The Statistics, 120 HARv. L. REV. 372, 382
tbl.III (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Statistics] (listing four "search and seizure" cases,
three of which were decided in favor of the government); The Supreme Court, 2004
Term-The Statistics, 119 HARv. L. REV. 415, 429 tbl.III (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Statistics] (listing three cases; all decided in favor of the government); The Supreme Court,
2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 497, 507 tbl.III (2004) [hereinafter 2003
Statistics] (listing six cases; all decided in favor of the government).
305 See 2005 Statistics, supra note 304, at 380 tbl.II(D) (stating that the Court
reversed or vacated lower court's judgment in 58 of 81, or 71.6% of, cases it reviewed
on a writ of certiorari); 2004 Statistics, supra note 304, at 426 tbl.II(D) (reversing or
vacating 60 of 83, or 72.3%); 2003 Statistics, supra note 304, at 505 tbl.II(D) (reversing
or vacating 59 of 76, or 77.6%).
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ment issues in favor of criminal defendants, perhaps in order to provide greater "analogical anchoring" for future cases. 30 6

The subject areas discussed in the previous three subparts could
easily be expanded, 30 7 but it is not my purpose to catalogue all of the
spheres in which an attempt to shape and direct lower court decisionmaking is a plausible explanation for recent developments in
Supreme Court doctrine. Instead, my aim in this Part has been to
make three fairly straightforward points:
First, distrust of lower courts as a motivator for doctrine creation
did not end with the Warren Court and need not be spurred by a
desire to enact policies likely to please the political left. To the contrary, one obvious connection between all three subjects discussed in
this Part is that the Court's efforts have been quite consistent with the
tenets of political conservatism.
Second, although use of rules may be the technique most commonly associated with efforts to control frontline decisionmakers, it is
far from the only tool at the Supreme Court's disposal. Rules were
not the sole tactic employed in any of the areas just discussed, and it
would be a stretch to label use of rules the primary strategy in any of
them.
Third, the various techniques discussed in Part II are in large
measure complementary to-and, to a certain extent, substitutes
for-one another. In all of the areas just discussed, the Court has
employed multiple techniques, and at times it has acknowledged that
308
it is using one because another is not available.
CONCLUSION

Legal scholars who study the relationship between rights and
remedies are fond of saying that the real meaning and value of the
former are determined by the generosity or stinginess of the latter. 30 9
306 See Shapiro, supra note 52, at 314 (suggesting that "[bly deciding a series of
cases in which it applied a standard, the Court could harness the traditional common

law method of analogical reasoning to mark a path for lower courts").
307 Arbitration seems like one particularly promising example. See Bruhl, supra

note 2.
308 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 291-94 (discussing the Court's adoption of de novo review in the Fourth Amendment context).
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
309 See, e.g.,
COLUM. L. REv. 857, 858 (1999) ("Rights are dependent on remedies notjust for their
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.").
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This Article suggests an important corollary: the extent to which the
Supreme Court values the rights it espouses in its opinions is demonstrated in large measure by the lengths to which it is willing to go to
secure lower court compliance with them. The fact that the Justices of
the Warren era were willing to bear enormous costs to achieve even
partial compliance with their vision of a better, fairer, criminal justice
system suggests that they were enormously committed to that goal. In
contrast, various rulings by the Burger, Rehnquist, and now Roberts
Courts that make it more difficult to overturn criminal convictions
based on even conceded constitutional violations indicate a comparatively lesser commitment.3 10
This Article also holds important lessons for political scientists.
Its exploration of the various ways in which the Supreme Court can
craft legal doctrines to constrain and direct the course of lower court
decisionmaking may suggest a partial answer to why every study of
which I am aware has found high levels of lower court compliance. 3 11
More broadly, its demonstration that the power dynamic between trial
and appellate courts is far from static illustrates the critical need "to
312
take law and legal institutions seriously."
In addition, my analysis suggests at least three areas for future
research. First, if one accepts that the Supreme Court can, and at
least sometimes apparently does, craft legal doctrines with an eye
toward influencing lower court decisionmaking, it may be useful to
consider the extent to which the most effective strategies for exerting
such influence depend on what precisely the Justices are attempting
to accomplish. At times, such as with respect to many of the Warren
Court's most famous doctrinal developments and more modern developments involving punitive damages, the Supreme Court's actions
seem designed to push lower courts towards greater protection of federal rights. But at other times, perhaps exemplified by more recent
trends in constitutional criminal procedure, the aim appears to be to
prevent lower courts from moving too fast. Although this Article's
analysis is far too preliminary to make any broad conclusions, it seems
entirely plausible that the relevant considerations may be meaningfully different depending on which sort of goal the Court aims to
3

accomplish.

13

310 I am grateful to Brandon Garrett for first pointing this out to me. See also
Steiker, supra note 269, at 2468-70.
311 Citations to a number of the studies are collected in Kim, supra note 3, at
394-96 & nn.41-47, and Songer, supra note 3, at 43-46.
312 Friedman, supra note 18, at 262.
313 I am indebted to John Jeffries for bringing this point to my attention.
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Second, this Article's largely descriptive account raises important
normative questions both about the relationship between the
Supreme Court and lower courts, as well as appropriate methodologies in constitutional and statutory interpretation. A number of
important pieces have examined the issue from the lower courts' perspective, in particular, the source, extent, and nature of their "obligation" to follow Supreme Court precedent.3 14 But there has been very
little work addressing what may be seen as the opposite question: the
extent to which it is legitimate for Supreme CourtJustices to interpret
concededly binding legal materials with at least one eye focused on
controlling lower court decisionmaking in cases that have not yet
3
arisen and will likely never come before the Court.

15

Finally, although this Article has focused almost exclusively on
doctrine formulation by the Supreme Court in its adjudicatory capacity, another profitable area for further inquiry would be the degree to
which concerns about lower courts may shape and be visible in the
products of both rulemaking and legislation. As to the former, consider the 1994 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence that
carved out an exception to trial judges' ability to exclude any evidence
that they deem unduly "prejudicial" by declaring evidence about certain categories of criminal convictions per se admissible 31 6 and others
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that created a new exception
to the final judgment rule for district court decisions about whether to
314 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. Rrv. 817 (1994); Michael C.
Dorf, Predictionand the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651 (1995); Kim, supra note 3, at
434-41; Michael Stokes Paulsen, AccusingJustice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert
M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82-84 (1989).
315 This issue has a certain overlap with, but is nonetheless distinct from, debates
about the existence and scope of the Supreme Court's "supervisory power." See, e.g.,
Barrett, supra note 80, at 328, 342-87 (arguing that the "Constitution's text, structure,
and history do not support the proposition that the Supreme Court possesses supervisory power over inferior courts by virtue of its constitutional supremecy"). Questions
about the supervisory power generally involve whether and to what extent structural
features of the Constitution and aspects of our political history authorize the Supreme
Court to impose restrictions on lower federal courts without claiming that those
restrictions are required by some external source of authority, such as the Constitution or a federal statute. See, e.g., id. at 353-87. In contrast, the issue flagged in the
text implicates broader questions regarding proper interpretive method, such as what
sorts of things the Justices may legitimately consider when deciding how to interpret
concededly binding sources of authority.
316 SeeFED. R. EVID. 413. But see United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th
Cir. 1998) (interpreting Rule 413 to allow consideration of prejudice to the defendant in order to avoid any constitutional concerns).
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certify a class action. 317 As to the latter, consider the provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act that declare that only
decisions by the Supreme Court itself may be relied upon as a basis for
granting federal habeas relief,3 18 and make federal district courts'
ability to entertain second-or-successive habeas petitions contingent
on approval by the courts of appeal,3 19 the sections of the Prison Litigation Reform Act that require lower courts (but not the Supreme
Court) to act on petitions to modify injunctive decrees within a particular time, 320 the parts of the Class Action Fairness Act that dramatically expand the scope of state law actions that may be removed to
federal court,3 2 1 or pretty much the entire history of the Sentencing
Reform Act 322 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3

23

Worries

about lower courts, these examples suggest, are hardly confined to the
Supreme Court of the United States.

317 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
318 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (2000).
319 See id. § 2244(b) (3).
320 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2000).
321 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b)-(c) (2000).
322 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C.); see also CharlesJ. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1940-44 (1988) (discussing attitudes
toward the "unfettered" discretion of federal judges).
323 See generally KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 1-142 (1998)
(discussing the history of the Guidelines as based upon a desire to reduce sentencing
disparities by reducing federal judges' discretion).

